Bill Bland on Revisionism

Lenin’s definition of revisionism is that it is

” … a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism” (Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘Marxism and Revisionism’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 11; London; 1943; p. 704).

Perhaps a more comprehensive definition of revisionism would be that it is an ideology which claims to be a development of Marxism but is in reality a deviation from Marxism which assists the anti-socialist aims of a capitalist class.

Clearly, revisionism has direct relevance only to people who believe they are Marxists. To the extent that it can persuade such people of its validity, it separates them from genuine Marxists and diverts them into anti-Marxist political activity. The struggle against revisionism is thus of particular importance in the period of building a Marxist-Leninist Party in countries where such a party does not yet exist.

Some comrades have no difficulty in recognising the revisionist character of Khrushchevite revisionism of the type of “The British Road to Socialism,” which is clearly anti-revolutionary, but cannot understand how other types of revisionism may support revolution.

But when we say that “revisionism assists the anti-socialist aims of a capitalist class,” one must understand that the anti-socialist aims of all capitalist classes do not follow an identical pattern, and we can identify different brands of revisionism corresponding to these different aims.

In particular, the aims of revisionists in developed capitalist countries differ from those of revisionists in colonial-type countries. Thus, the former is anti-revolutionary typified by Khrushchevite revisionism of the type of “The British Road to Socialism.” However, revisionism in colonial-type countries is to a certain extent revolutionary, reflecting the desire of national bourgeoisies of colonial-type countries to carry through the national-democratic stage of the revolutionary process in such countries, but to halt the revolutionary process before it proceeds to the socialist stage; this second form of revisionism is typified by “Mao Tse-tung Thought” and, as we shall see, by “Kimilsungism.”

– Bill Bland, “The Workers’ Party of Korea and Revisionism”

Writings on the Role of Lavrenty Beria

Stalin and supporters continued this struggle against opposition from other elements in the Bolshevik Party, resolutely but with diminishing chances for success, until Stalin died in March 1953. Lavrentii Beria’s determination to continue this same struggle seems to be the real reason Khrushchev and others murdered him, either judicially, by trial on trumped-up charges in December 1953, or — as much evidence suggests — through literal murder, the previous June.

[....] 

Beria’s “Hundred Days” — really, 112 days, from Stalin’s death on March 5 1953 to Beria’s removal on June 26 — witnessed the inception of a large number of dramatic reforms. Had the Soviet leadership permitted these reforms to fully develop, the history of the Soviet Union, the international communist movement, the Cold War — in short, of the last half of the 20th century – would have been dramatically different.

[....] 

The wide circulation and credence given to these stories among Russians of all political camps show that many Russians believe Stalin’s and Beria’s deaths were all too convenient for the nomenklatura. The evidence that Beria, like Stalin, wanted a communist perestroika — a “restructuring,” albeit of political, not economic, power, instead of the capitalist super-exploitation and fleecing of the country that has gone under that name since the late 1980s — is quite independent of any evidence that they may have been murdered.

Source: Grover Furr’s “Stalin and the Struggle for Democratic Reform”

Khrushchev records a discussion with fellow-revisionist Nikolay Bulganin by Stalin’s death-bed on the danger to their plans if the Marxist-Leninist Lavrenty Beria were to become again Minister in control of the. security services:

“‘Stalin’s not going to pull through. . . . You know what posts Beria will take for himself?’
‘Which one?’
‘He will try and make himself Minister of State Security. No matter what happens, we can’t let him do this. If he becomes Minister of State Security it will be the beginning of the end for us’.
Bulganin said he agreed with me”,
(N. S. Khrushchev (1971): p. 319).

[....]

But by the end of June 1953, it had become clear that the efforts to convince the Marxist-Leninists that the exculpation of the doctors had been justified had only been temporarily successful. Headed by Beria, the security forces, under Marxist-Leninist control since the readjustment of portfolios after Stalin’s death, were continuing to inestigate the ‘doctors’ case’.

Clearly, if the revisionist conspirators were to feel safe, Beria and his Marxist-Leninist colleagues in the security forces had to be eliminated as a matter of urgency.

On 10 July 1953, a few days after Beria had been arrested, a leading article in ‘Pravda’ revealed the real reason for that arrest — a reason not disclosed in the report of his ‘trial’ — namely, that he had ‘deliberately impeded’ and ‘tried to distort’ instructions of the Central Committee and the Soviet government designed to clear up ‘certain illegal and abritary actions’ — an obvious reference to the ‘doctors’ case’:

“Having been charged with carrying out ‘the Instructions of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government with a view . . . to clearing up certain illegal and arbitrary actions, Beria deliberately impeded the implementation of these instructions and, in a number of cases, tried to distort them”.
(‘Pravda’, 10 July 1953, in: B. Nicolaevsky: op. cit.; p. 147).

Source: Bill Bland’s “The ‘Doctors’ Case’ and the Death of Stalin”

“Stalin was trying hard to limit the damage being done by a revisionist (i.e., Yezhov — WBB). In this situation, Lavrenty Beria was put in this sensitive and critical job. Stalin himself put Beria into this job.

Beria ‘cleansed’ the NKVD (the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs — Ed.). He placed trusted Bolsheviks in the key positions. As he had personal knowledge from Georgia of who was reliable or not, many of the appointees were from Georgia.

It is accepted by even hostile and anti-Marxist writers that, following Beria’s changes, thousands of prisoners in the camps were released.

Marxist-Leninists are aware that Beria effectively cleared the NKVD of revisionist practices and revisionist personnel”.
(Alliance No. 30 (October 1998); p. 85. 86. 87).

[....]

“It was essential to have in charge of the Russian atomic bomb project someone who was an utterly reliable Bolshevik. Stalin ensured that Lavrenty Beria was given this mandate”
(Alliance, No. 30 (October 1998); p. 87).

[....]

The chronology of the coups and counter-coups in Georgia makes it clear, in my view, that Beria was a Marxist-Leninist.

Source: Bill Bland’s “On the Coups and Counter-Coup in Georgia”

This (ON BERIA) is related to Ludo Martens’ book “Another View of Stalin.” It is a critique of his assessment of Beria. The rest of the Martens’ book relies on facts. However oddly, in stark contrast to the rest of the book, the analysis of Lavrenty Beria does NOT show facts at all. Martins has only theories and/or rumor or gossip, which is what Kremlinologists used to create the totalitarian paradigm against all of Soviet society! Why would he believe this or believe Khrushchev?

[....]

It was enemies that considered Beria an enemy, enemies that were in fact capitalists, never communists, and who proved this of themselves later on by wrecking collectives that worked well!. There were only THEORIES or ACCUSATIONS against Beria to that effect, primarily based on his desire to return to a NEP-type system for awhile after WWII . Well, Lenin did it after the Civil War for the same reasons Beria wanted to do it after World War II. Accusations are insinuated due to Beria’s desire to keep friendly with the West – who, after all, were ALLIES in WWII. Why not be friendly with allies?

In going along with the idea of Beria that Martens presents, Martens is falling INTO the same totalitarian paradigm that his entire book seeks to dismantle.

Beria did a good job for Stalin, in fact, an EXCELLENT, SUPERB job. Far from wanting to kill Stalin, Beria did everything in his power AGAINST STALIN’S ORDERS to try to prevent Stalin from wandering into mined areas of land during the time Stalin insisted on staying in Moscow in the war. Stalin could have been easily killed: Beria was trying to prevent this. Beria also had MANY occasions to kill Stalin AND get away with it!

Source: On Lavrenty Beria

But a prominent charge regarded Beria’s advocacy of a “unified Germany”. Leading the charge against Ulbricht’s sectarian polices was Beria, who was “indignant when I (Ulbricht) opposed the policy concerning the German question in 1953”: Knight Ibid; p. 192). Several sources point to the significance of this charge:

“The Soviet leadership offers the following reasons for the charges against Beria. . . . ‘ that he advocated the creation of a unified Germany as a “bourgeois, peace-loving nation” (1:162) and the abandonment of East Germany’s status as a separate, socialist state;” [On the Crimes and Anti-Party, Anti-Government Activities of Beria.] Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2-7 July 1953, from Izvestia CC – CPSU:1991, 1:140-214 & 2:141-208. New Evidence on Beria’s Downfall, by Rachel A. Connell.

“New accounts confirm that Beria did want to trade German reunification for neutralization.” ‘New Evidence on the East German Uprising of 1953; ”Paper #3: Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum, “Cold War History Project” by James Richter.

Source: Fighting German ultra-leftist revisionism

The Juche Idea in the Light of Marxism-Leninism

By Gary Howell

1. CONTEXT

In 1992, the DPRK revised its constitution to exclude any reference to Marxism-Leninism, having previously described the Juche Idea as a development of Marxism-Leninism. Also in that year, the so-called “Pyongyang Declaration” was signed by a number of parties claiming to be Marxist-Leninist.

These events need to be seen, as many comrades have explained, in the context of the Workers’ Party of Korea trying to exert a leadership role over the various “Communist” parties and National Democratic movements throughout the world, following the complete degeneration of the Khruschevite revisionist bloc into capitalist restoration and the revisionist betrayal of Socialist Albania by the traitor Ramiz Alia, et al.

In this context should also be seen the WPK’s desire to foist the two Kim’s Juche Idea onto the international “Communist” movement, under the pretext that Marxism-Leninism had shown its “limitations and ideo-theoretical immaturities”. So, what exactly is this Juche Idea, which the WPK claims – not in so many words mind! – the International Proletariat is in need of to explain present day conditions, now that Marxism-Leninism has shown its “limitations”?

2. THE JUCHE IDEA

Kim Jong Il claimed, in his essay “The Juche Philosophy is an Original Revolutionary Philosophy” that the Juche Idea is no mere development of Marxism-Leninism, but an entirely new revolutionary philosophy:

“We must give a clear understanding of the Juche Philosophy as a new revolutionary philosophy, not as a mere development of the preceding philosophy.”

And…

“…some development of materialism and dialectics does not constitute the basic content of the Juche philosophy.”

And…

“The Juche philosophy is an original philosophy which is fundamentally different from the preceding philosophy in its tasks and principles.”

So, to sum up the differences between Marxism-Leninism and the Juche Idea, in their tasks and principles, and answers to the basic question of philosophy, according to Kim Jong Il:

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION of MARXISM-LENINISM:
” The relationship between material and consciousness, between being and thinking.”

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION of the JUCHE IDEA:
“The relationship between the world and man, and man’s position and role in the world.”

This leads to the PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE of JUCHE:
“Man is the master of everything and decides everything.”

So, the MAJOR TASK OF MARXISM-LENINISM:
“The clarification of the essence of the material world and the general law of its motion.”

Whereas

The MAJOR TASK of the JUCHE IDEA:
“The clarification of man’s essential characteristics and the law of the social movement, man’s movement.”

But, what exactly are the differences between Marxism-Leninism and the Juche Idea according to Kim Jong Il? Well, the answer is, when you read what he says, rather banal:

In a nutshell, he doesn’t deny that the universal laws and categories of Dialectical Materialism operate in nature and society (and, by definition, thought as well). He also does not deny that the laws of social development operate in society, thus:

“Of course, society, too, changes and develops in accordance with a certain law, not by man’s own will… Some of the laws of society governs every society in general irrespective of social systems, and some of them governs a particular society.”

But, Marxism-Leninism, according to Kim Jong Il, mechanically applies Dialectical Materialism to society -

“The major limitation of the materialistic conception of history is that it failed to correctly expound the peculiar law of the social movement and explained the principles of the social movement mainly on the basis of the common character of the motion of nature and the social movement in that both of them are the motion of material.

“Marxist materialistic conception of history broke down society into social being and social consciousness and attached determining significance to the social being; it also broke down the social structure into productive force and production relations, foundation and superstructure, and attached decisive significance to material production and economic relations. This means an unaltered application of the principle of materialistic dialectics to society, the principle that the world is of material and changes and develops in accordance with the general law of the motion of material. The world, viewed by the founders of Marxism when applying the general law governing the material world to social history, is an integrity of not only nature but also man and society in that they are material beings. If you consider man as a part of the world, a material integrity, not as a social being with independence, creativity and consciousness, and apply the general law of the movement of material world to social history, you cannot avoid seeing the social-historical movement as a process of the history of nature.”

The above quotation of Kim Jong Il should serve as a monument to the incoherence and self-contradictory nature that is the essence of the Juche Idea.

Kim Jong Il starts off by asserting that an Apple is not an Apple but an Orange, and then proceeds to demonstrate beyond doubt that all the features of the Orange – texture, feel, look, taste, etc., are those of the Apple – but still asserts that the Apple is an Orange!

The “principle that the world is of material and changes and develops in accordance with the general law of material” IS “society, too, changes and develops in accordance with a certain law, not by man’s own will.”

“Material” means “Objectively”, i.e., independently of man’s will, outside of man’s consciousness, but it seems Kim Jong Il’s mind operates according to a different logic than the rest of humanity, one where 1+1 really does equal 3 and where one really can square circles on a daily basis. But, in the real world, his assertions are patent nonsense. It should be apparent now that the features I have outlined so far are those that have an identity with all brands of revisionism, from Bernstein’s brand onwards, namely that “new conditions” necessitate the “creative development” of Marxism-Leninism, which, in reality means divesting it of its revolutionary essence, the difference, in the WRP’s case being that Marxism-Leninism’s “limitations and ideo-theoretical immaturities” necessitate its wholesale replacement with the two Kims’ scatter-brained petit bourgeois farrago of distortions of Marxism-Leninism – aka, the Juche Idea. This shouldn’t come as any surprise to Marxist-Leninists who are well aware of the feudalistic personality cult that surrounds the two Kims, the anti-Marxist leadership theories that have been perpetrated in the DPRK, where, it is said, over 30 000 monuments to the “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung, have been erected.

To assert that because the universal laws and categories of Dialectical Materialism apply to society, as they apply to nature and to thought, that therefore, Marxism views man as an animal in nature, is sheer lunacy, that even Kim Jong Il himself contradicts, further on in his essay. He is just thrashing about, trying to find holes in Marxist-Leninist philosophy that are just not there, so he resorts to ‘straw man arguments’ against Dialectical and Historical materialism, in order to try and justify their replacement with the decidedly dodgy Juche Idea.

Here is another of Kim Jong Il’s ‘straw man arguments’:

“The Marxist philosophy defined the essence of man as an ensemble of social relations, but it failed to correctly expound the characteristics of man as a social being. The preceding theory explained the principle of the social movement mainly on the basis of the general law of the development of the material world, because it failed to clarify the essential qualities of social man. For the first time the Juche philosophy gave a perfect elucidation of the unique qualities of man as a social being.”

Further on…

“The origin of man’s essential qualities must be sought not in the development of his features common with those of other material beings (animals – G) but in the characteristics unique to him.”

As regards the concept of “social being”, it should not be understood as Marxist-Leninists understand the term:

“Regarding man’s essential qualities, it is important to have a correct understanding of the social being. The founders of Marxism, while raising the question of man’s essence in social relationship, used the phrase social being as a concept meaning the material conditions and economic relations of social life which exist objectively and are reflected in social consciousness. Since they regarded man as a component of productive forces, as the ensemble of social relations, the phrase social being they used implied man as well. However, they did not use it as one having the particular meaning that defines man’s essential qualities. Systematizing the Juche Philosophy, we used the term social being as one having the particular meaning that defines man’s essential qualities. In the theory of the Juche philosophy man is the only social being in the world.”

Further…

“The Juche Philosophy is a new philosophy which has its own system and content, so its categories must not be understood in the conventional meaning.”

So, according to the Juche Idea, “Man is a social being with independence, creativity and consciousness.”

The sheer banality of this definition will be obvious to anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. It is the marxist-leninist definition of man’s essential qualities which is the adequate explanation, not the vacuous distortion that is the Juche definition.(1)

The Juche definition of man’s essential characteristics rips man out of time ands space – in other words, it is an abstraction. Marxism-Leninism, never abstracts man from the world. In Marxism-Leninism’s characterization, man is always concrete man. Man exists exclusively in a concrete time and place, in a definite social-economic formation, in definite relationships with other people, e.g., class, family, nation, peer group, work collective and so on.

So, in effect, the Juche Idea’s definition of man’s essential qualities is meaningless and worthless in the scientific reflection of the objective law-governed world and man’s position and role in it.

DEFINITION OF THE NATION

“The following happened when Kim Jong Il was a student at Kim Il Sung University, One autumn day in 1960, during a lecture on Korean history, there was an argument on whether or not Koreans overseas could be considered a part of the Korean nation, since the Marxist-Leninist classics said that only when the foregoing conditions – common language, territory, economic life and psychology manifested in culture – were met could the people constitute a nation.

‘ In those days, scholars who dogmatically accepted the existing theories held that the Korean nation had been formed either in the 18th century when Korea was in the initial stage of capitalist development or in the period of Japanese imperialist colonial rule or even after liberation on August 15, 1945. Kim Jong Il criticized their dogmatic view based on the Marxist-Leninist Classics and said that the basic indexes of a nation are homogeneity of bloodline, a common language and a common territory; in particular, that bloodline and language are the most important in defining a nation, and that a nation is a solid group of people who are united with homogeneity of bloodline, language and territory.

‘He went on to say that Korean nation has long lived in one territory, inheriting the same bloodline and speaking the same language, and it is a nation with a history of 5,000 years and with a splendid culture, and that expatriates, too, belong to Korean nation. A nation is a cohesive group of people that was formed historically and the largest unit of social life. A nation is not formed or broken up easily by a change in the social system. The formation of a nation conditions the appearance of social classes and strata. Even in a classless society the nation still exists. If one’s bloodline and language are same, one belongs to one and the same nation, even though one’s ideology, ideals and territory are different. This is his outlook on the nation.

‘Our nation is a homogeneous nation descended from Tangun that has inherited only one bloodline for 5,000 years. Such a phenomenon is rare in the world. Homogeneity of bloodline is the most important characteristic of a nation. If we regard a common economic life as the main mark of a nation as held by previous theories, our fellow countrymen who live under the different economic systems of north and south Korea should be divided into a “bourgeois nation” and a “socialist nation”, and several million Korean expatriates could not be regarded as part of our nation. Viewed from this angle, Kim Jong Il is the benefactor who has identified all the people in the north and south and the several million expatriates as belonging to one and the same nation. Language is another important factor defining a nation. Of the several factors defining a nation, territory and culture may be altered, but the homogeneity of bloodline and a common language cannot be changed. Since the people of north and south Korea have inherited the same bloodline and speak the same language, even though they have lived in different territories and under different economic conditions for more than 50 years since the country’s division, they have a feeling of affinity and friendship. A common territory is not the same as the territory ruled by State power.

‘The territorial definition of a nation means the land where fellow countrymen of the same bloodline and speaking one language have lived their lives from generation to generation. The territory of a national community might be occupied by foreign forces, but it cannot be lost; even a subject nation cannot abandon the land where their forefathers have lived.

‘The main territory of Koreans is the land of 3,000 ri (One ri is 400 metres) where they have lived for 5,000 years. (5,000-ri means the total length of Korea’s territory.) This land remained our nation’s home in the 41-year period of Japanese colonial rule and cannot be land owned by Americans because they have occupied the southern part of our country for half a century. It is our nation’s living space and nest today and will be forever in the future as in the past.

‘A common culture needs to be viewed by taking bloodline and language as the common features. This is because the character, mentality and consciousness of a nation are unthinkable apart from communities based on blood and language.

‘As seen above, Kim Jong Il’s definition of a nation based on one’s blood and language is correct and scientific. Kim Jong Il gave a wise answer to the question of our nation’s formation. Criticizing the dogmatic view which fixed the time of the formation of our nation to the development of capitalism, he said: “Our people is a homogeneous nation who have inherited one bloodline, language and culture in one territory from olden times, and it is a wise nation with 5,000 years of history, a brilliant culture and splendid traditions.” The question of a nation’s founding is a basic one for the theory of the nation and is the starting point to systematize a nation’s history.

‘The Korean nation was not formed in modern society in the course of capitalist development. Our compatriots long lived in one territory having one blood, language and culture, and in the course of history they became a single nation. The beginnings of the nation’s formation can be seen in clan society. With the emergence of the state, the clan became a special group settling in a certain region. In due course, this developed into a nation. This is a brief summary of his view on the formation of our nation. His Juche-oriented view of the features of our nation and of its formation presents a compass for people who were in the past obsessed with flunkyism and dogmatism to use their own brains and think independently about national questions.”

(Full Embodiment of National Independence – from Guiding Light General Kim Jong Il, Foreign languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, DPRK, 1997)

Kim Jong Il’s definition of the Nation here is not a million miles removed from the Nazis’ mystical views on “blood and soil” (blut unt boden). There is no such thing as a pure “race” or a pure “ethnic group”. We are, in the words of the scientists, “energetic mongrels”. The idea that the definition of a nation can be thought of in terms of “bloodline” is just laughable and merely reflects the pseudo scientific character of the “Juche Idea”. Kim Jong Il’s ideas on the nation are eclectic and metaphysical. They certainly do not reflect the dialectical nature of the objective law governed world. What, in Kim Jong Il’s mind would Britain, France and Germany represent then, with their multi ethnic, multi-cultural states, let alone the USA and Canada and Australia?

There are not many countries that would fit Kim Jong Il’s definition of a nation, if we accepted his thesis.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion I assert that it is Marxism-Leninism that enables man to scientifically comprehend the world in all its aspects and properties, in dialectical unity and development. Comrade Enver Hoxha, in his book “Reflections on China” summed up Kim Il Sung as a ‘vacillating revisionist megalomaniac’. His definition of Kim Il Sung hits the nail on the head not only as regards Kim Il Sung and his offspring, but the “theory” of Juche as well, which perfectly reflects in ideas, the psychology so effectively laid bare in Comrade Enver’s polemic.

I hope that this article will serve as an additional component of the Marxist-Leninist polemic against the Juche Idea, to be read with comrade Norberto Steinmayr’s article and our departed Comrade Bill Bland’s articles against the Juche Idea.

Comrades need to be aware that in these days of continuing ideological confusion, the defense of Marxism-Leninism against all brands of petit-bourgeois distortions of our science must be taken up and all their schemes to foist their subjective, eclectic, metaphysical and hence, idealist “theories” on the international revolutionary working class movement must be soundly defeated.

That the total degeneration of the Soviet revisionist bloc countries should have been the catalyst to the elevating of the Juche Idea to the level of a completely brand new scientific socialism, replacing Marxism-Leninism in its entirety came as no surprise to those Marxist-Leninists such as Bill Bland who were well acquainted with how revisionism rears its ugly head, every time the social conditions provide for its appearance. Now that we know about the Juche Idea in detail, in part due to the wonders of the internet, Kim Il Sung’s petit bourgeois pseudo scientific nonsense can be exposed and expelled…let the struggle begin!

Sources for this article:

Kim Jong Il:” The Juche Philosophy is an Original Revolutionary Philosophy” (1996).

Kim Jong Il:”Full Embodiment of National Independence”

Enver Hoxha: “Reflections On China” Vol. II, p.143

(1) Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”: “Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” And further on; “Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.” (Karl Marx, Selected Works, Progress Publishers, p.14)

Bill Bland: The Workers’ Party of Korea and Revisionism

Written by Bill Bland for the Communist League

INTRODUCTION

In his paper entitled ‘THE WPK’S STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM’, Comrade Dermot Hudson expresses agreement with a reported statement by Nina Andreyeva:

“As the Russian communist leader Dr. Nina Andreyeva remarked at the Copenhagen Seminar on the Juche Idea in 1995…” (Dermot Hudson: ‘The WPK’s Struggle against Modern Revisionism’; p. 1).

The statement concerned was to the effect that the critique of modern revisionism made by the Workers’ Party of Korea was

” … more throroughgoing and mature … ” (Nina Andreyeva: Statement at Copenhagen Seminar on the Juche Idea’ (1995), cited in: Dermot Hudson: ibid,; p. 1).

than that made by the Albanian Party of Labour.

Two short quotations are enough to demonstrate the questionable accuracy of Andreyeva’s assertion. In December 1960. the leader of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, told the Central Committee of the PLA:

“Following his advent to power, Khrushchev and his revisionist group had worked out a complete plan: Marxism- Leninism would be negated and all those trends and persons that had been unmasked, attacked and defeated as anti- Marxists, or who had been liquidated by Marxism-Leninism in action, were to be rehabilitated … This meant that both Lenin and Stalin had to be attacked … Today it has become even clearer that these intriguers, liars, opportunists and revisionists are doing all these things openly … Our Party is fully convinced that such monstrous accusations and slanders were brought against Stalin to discredit both him as a person, and the work of this great Marxist-Leninist … Khrushchev and his group are on a revisionist course”. (Enver Hoxha: Closing Speech at the 21st Plenum of the CC of the PLA (December 1960), in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 3; Tirana: 1980: p. 167-68. 169).

In contrast, a Korean delegation in Moscow, signed in July 1961 a joint communique saying that the talks which had been been held there had shown

” … ‘complete identity of views’ between the Soviet and North Korean leaders on questions relating to the international communist movement” (Soviet-Korean Joint Communique (10 July 1961), in: ‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 13: p. 18,246)

while, for its part, the WPK accepted the Khrushchevite-led Communist Party of the Soviet Union as

” … the universally recognised vanguard of the world Communist movement”. (Soviet-Korean Joint Communique (10 July 1961), in: ‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 13: p. 18,246).

Furthermore, Comrade Hudson holds that the WPK saw

” … modern revisionism as originating in the 1950s … rather than … as a phenomenon of the late 1980s, associated with Gorbachev”. (Dermot Hudson: ibid,; p. 1).

And yet, when Kim Il Sung visited the Soviet Union in October 1986, he expressed support for the socio-economic reforms adopted at the 27th Congress of the CPSU and, in his banquet speech, praised Gorbachev by saying:

“This new change now taking place in the Soviet Union is unthinkable apart from the energetic activities of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, a staunch Marxist-Leninist”. (Kim Il Sung: Moscow Banquet Speech of 24 October 1986, in: Dae-Ho Byun: ‘North Korea’s Foreign Policy: The Juche Ideology and the Challenge of Gorbachev’s New Thinking’; Seoul: 1991; p. 186).

Clearly, the attitude of the WPK to revisionism is not that of principled opposition since the 1950s suggested by Comrade Hudson.

THE DEFINITION OF REVISIONISM

Lenin’s definition of revisionism is that it is ” … a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism” (Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘Marxism and Revisionism’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 11; London; 1943; p. 704).

Perhaps a more comrehensive definition of revisionism would be that it is an ideology which claims to be a development of Marxism but is in reality a deviation from Marxism which assists the anti-socialist aims of a capitalist class.

Clearly, revisionism has direct relevance only to people who believe they are Marxists. To the extent that it can persuade such people of its validity, it separates them from genuine Marxists and diverts them into anti-Marxist political activity.

The struggle against revisionism is thus of particular importance in the period of building a Marxist-Leninist Party in countries where such a party does not yet exist. Some comrades have no difficulty in recognising the revisionist character of Khrushchevite revisionism of the type of ‘The British Road to Socialism’, which is clearly anti- revolutionary, but cannot understand how other types of revisionism may support revolution. But when we say that ‘revisionism assists the anti-socialist aims of a capitalist class’, one must understand that the anti- socialist aims of all capitalist classes do not follow an identical pattern, and we can identify different brands of revisionism corresponding to these different aims.

In particular, the aims of revisionists in developed capitalist countries differ from those of revisionists in colonial-type countries. Thus, the former is anti-revolutionary typified by Khrushchevite revisionism of the type of ‘The British Road to Socialism’. However, revisionism in colonial-type countries is to a certain extent revolutionary, reflecting the desire of national bourgeoisies of colonial-type countries to carry through the national-democratic stage of the revolutionary process in such countries, but to halt the revolutionary process before it proceeds to the socialist stage; this second form of revisionism is typified by ‘Mao Tse-tung Thought’ and, as we shall see, by ‘Kimilsungism’.

THE MARXIST-LENINIST FACETS OF KIMILSUNGISM

In some important respects, Kimilsungism is fully in accord with the Marxist-Leninist principles of the revolutionary process in colonial-type countries. These principles are:

Firstly, that the revolutionary process in such countries consists of two stages: that of national-democratic revolution and that of socialist revolution.

In the first stage,

” … the Korean people … are … faced with the tasks of carrying out an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘On the Building of New Korea and the National United Front’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 1; Pyongyang; 1975; p, 3).

“Comrade Kim Il Sung … pointed out the need to continue the revolution after the completion of the anti- imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution so as to build socialist, communist society”., (Kim Han Gil: ‘Modern History of Korea’; Pyongyang: 1979; p. 34).

Secondly, that the Marxist-Leninist Party should strive to mobilise the maximum of class forces objectively possible for each stage of the revolution:

“It is possible to conquer the more powerful enemy only by … necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skilfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this fail to understand even a grain of Marxism”. (Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘”Left-wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder’; in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 10; London; 1946: p. 112).

“The Communist Party of each country must unfailingly avail itself of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally for the proletariat, even if a temporary, vacillating, unstable and unreliable ally”. (Josef V. Stalin: ‘Notes on Contemporary Themes’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).

Thirdly, in the first stage of the revolutionary process, the democratic stage, these forces include the national bourgeoisie:

“To build a Democratic People’s Republic, a united front must be formed of all the patriotic democratic forces, including … the national capitalists” (Kim Il Sung: op. cit.; p. 4).

“The national capitalists participated in the democratic revolution”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang: 1977; p. 20).

Fourthly, that the Party should strive to gain the leadership of this stage of the revolution:

“In the struggle to establish a Democratic People’s Republic, the Communists … should be at the head of the masses of the people and lead them forward”. (Kim Il Sung: op. cit.; p. 5).

THE REVISIONIST FACETS OF KIMILSUNGISM

The revisionist facets of Kimilsungism relate to the period of transition to the socialist revolution, and to the socialist revolution itself.

The Question of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

According to Marxism-Leninism, socialism can be constructed only through the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat:

“Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. To it there corresponds a period of political transition, in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat”. (Programme of the Communist International’, in: Jane Degras (Ed.): ‘The Communist International: 1919-1943; Documents’, Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 490).

“The revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay”. (Josef V. Stalin ‘The Foundations of Leninism’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 6; Moscow: 1963; p. 112).

According to Kimilsungism, however, the dictatorship of the proletariat is unnecessary in a colonial-type country like Korea:

“The democracy we aspire to is fundamentally different from that of Western capitalist countries, nor is it a slavish copy of that in a socialist country … Ours is a new type of democracy most suited to the reality of Korea”. (Kim Il Sung: “On Progressive Democracy’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 1; Pyongyang; 1980; p. 257).

“The establishment of the power of the proletarian dictatorship by force was followed as a last resort in some countries, … In the northern half (of Korea — Ed.) … this was not necessary”. (Baik Bong: ‘Kim Il Sung: Biography’, Volume 2; Beirut; 1973; p. 176).

Accordingly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, established in North Korea in September 1948, was officially described as a state based on the joint dictatorship of several classes, including the national capitalists:

“A Democratic People’s Republic … must be built by forming a democratic united front … which embraces … even the national capitalists”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘On the Building of New Korea and the Mational United, in: ‘Works’, Volume 1; Pyongyang; 1980: p. 298).

According to Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a state in which the proletariat holds power alone, and does not share power with other classes:

“The class that took political power did so in the knowledge that it was doing so alone. That is intrinsic to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It has meaning only when one class knows that it is taking power alone”. (Vladimir I. Lenin: Speech Delivered at the All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers, in: ‘Collected Works’, Volume 32; Moscow; 1965; p. 273-74).

“The class of proletarians … does not and cannot share power with other classes”, (Josef V. Stalin: ‘Concerning Questions of Leninism’, in: ‘Works’, Volue 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 27).

However, in violation of these Marxist-Lenininist principles, by 1958 the leadership of the WPK was presenting this state of the joint dictatorship of several classes, including the national bourgeoisie, as ‘belonging to the category of the dictatorship of the proletariat’:

“Some people say that our people s power is not one that exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat because it is based on a united front. This is a completely erroneous view. Today our people’s power is a state power that belongs in the category of the dictatorship of the proletariat”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘For the Successful Implementation of the First Five-Year Plan’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 12; Pyongyang; 1983; p. 115).

The Transition to the Stage of Socialist Revolution

Marxism-Leninism holds that, in the transition from the national-democratic stage of the revolutionary process to the socialist stage

” … the proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie”. (Josef V. Stalin: ‘Questions of the Chinese Revolution’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 225).

In violation of this Marxist-Leninist principle, Kimilsungism holds that the transition to the socialist stage of the revolutionary process can be carried though in continued alliance with the national bourgeoisie:

“The entrepreneurs and traders of our country are fellow- travellers … not only in carrying out the democratic revolution but also in socialist construction”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘On the Immediate Tasks of the People’s Power in Socialist Construction’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 2; Pyongyang; 1975; p. 37).

“From the beginning our policy in regard to the national bourgeoisie was not only to carry out the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution together with them, but also to take them along with us to a socialist, communist society”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘Let Us further Strengthen the Socialist System of Our Country’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 6; Pyongyang; 1975; p. 317).

“The national capitalists … came out in support of the Party’s line of the socialist revolution”. the Party’s line of the socialist revolution”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang; 1977; p. 20).

Peaceful Remoulding of the National Capitalists

Kimilsungism, while accepting that there is the ‘risk’ of class struggle between the working class and the national bourgeoisie in a colonial-type country, maintains that this can be resolved peacefully, by remoulding the national capitalists, by education and persuasion, into working people:

“The capitalist elements still remaining in town and country will have to be … remoulded along socialist lines, instead of expropriating them”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘Every Effort for the Country’s Reunification and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Half of the Republic’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 9; Pyongyang; 1982; p. 201).

“The socialist transformation of private trade and industry … proceeded in close combination with the remoulding of men, with the result that private traders and manufacturers were reshaped into socialist working people”. (Kim Han Gil: op. cit.; p. 387).

“Since our Party adopted a policy of transforming capitalist traders and manufacturers peacefully, instead of expropriating them, the form of class struggle could not but assume a specific character. Class struggle attendant on the socialist transformation of capitalist trade and industry was unfolded mainly by means of persuasion and education”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang; 1977; p. 26).

Already in April 1929, Stalin was pouring ridicule on the revisionist thesis of ‘remoulding’ capitalists:

“Until now, we Marxist-Leninists were of the opinion that between the capitalists of town and country on the one hand, and the working class, on the other hand, there is an irrencilable antagonism of interests. That is what the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle rests on. But according to to Bukharin’s theory of the capitalists’ peaceful growth into socialism, all this is turned upside down, the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into socialism … One thing or the other: Either Marx’s theory of the class struggle, or the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism. (Josef V. Stalin: ‘The Right Deviation in the CPSU (B)’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p. 32, 33).

A SPURIOUS SOCIALISM

If a new society was established in North Korea in cooperation with the national bourgeoisie, then, according to Marxism-Leninism, it could not be a genuine and must be a spurious socialist society.

However, Kimilsungism differs from Maoism in rejecting the strategy of forming joint state-capitalist (joint state-private) enterprises in favour of forming ‘cooperatives’ in conjunction with the national capitalists:

“Our country was the first to transform capitalist traders and manufacturers along socialist lines by using the cooperative economy … This is an original experience”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang; 1977; p. 28).

“Comrade Kim Il Sung held that, different from some socialist countries, it was wholly unnecessary for the peaceful transformation of capitalist trade and industry to assume the form of state capitalism”. (Baik Bong: op. cit., Volume 2; p. 520).

This process of cooperativisation was not enforced upon national capitalists, but was an entirely voluntary process:

“Our Party adopted the line of transforming capitalist trade and manufacturing along socialist lines and saw to it that the capitalist traders and manufacturers were drawn into diverse forms of cooperative economy in strict observance of the voluntary principle”, (Kim Il Sung: ‘Let Us further Strengthen the Socialist System of Our Country’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 6; Pyongyang; 1975; p. 317).

“The important demand of the voluntary principle is … to strictly guard against coercive methods in cooperativisation and conduct this movement according to the free will of private traders and manufacturers”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang; 1977; p. 31).

Of the three forms of cooperative introduced into Korea, two forms were open to national capitalists to join if they wished. In the second form, the national capitalists received what amounted to interest on the capital they brought with them when they entered the cooperative:

“The second form (of cooperation –Ed.) was a semi- socialist form in which the means of production were under both joint and private ownership and both socialist distribution according to work done and distribution according to the amount of investment were applied. The third form was a completely socialist form in which … only socialist distribution applied”. (KIm Han Gil: op. cit.; p. 387).

As has been said, the national capitalists were empowered to choose not only whether to join a cooperative, but which type they would join:

“The essential requirement of the voluntary principle is to make private traders and manufacturers … choose the forms (of cooperation — Ed.) of their own accord, instead of imposing any form on them”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Industry and Industry nd (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang: 1977; p. 72).

The voluntary principle and the principle of mutual interests were observed in the cooperative transformation of capitalist traders and manufactuerers”. (Baik Bong: op. cit., Volume 2; p. 520).

Thus, most national capitalists tended to choose the second form of cooperation, since in this way they received

” … reasonable dividends upon the investments”. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang; 1977; p. 143).

“The second form (of cooperation — Ed.) was popular in the cooperation of capitalist trade and industry. It was a rational form which was readily acceptable to capitalists because it applied distribution according to the amount of investment”. (Kim Han Gil: op. cit.; p. 387).

However, according to the WPK, the mere act of joining a cooperative transformed national capitalists into ‘socialist working people’:

“By joining the producers’ cooperatives, the entrepreneurs and traders … were transformed into socialist working people”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘The Democratic People’s Republic is the Banner of Freedom and Independence for Our People …’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 5; Pyongyang; 1975; p. 151).

By August 1958,

” … the ratio of private traders and industrialists who joined cooperatives stood at … 100% by the end of August 1958″. (‘Socialist Transformation of Private Trade and Industry in Korea’; Pyongyang; 1977; p. 153).

So that, on this basis, Kim Il Sung felt able to declare in September 1958:

“The socialist transformation of production relations has now been completed … Thus, our society has become a socialist one”. (Kim Il Sung: ‘Against Passivism and Conservatism in Socialist Construction’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 2; Pyongyang; 1975; p. 233).

Loyalty to the Leader Marxism-Leninism condemns the concept of loyalty to an individual. As Stalin said in a letter of April 1930:

“You speak of your ‘devotion’ to me… I would advise you to discard the ‘principle’ of devotion to persons. It is not the Bolshevik way. Be devoted to the working class, its Party, its state. That is a fine and useful thing. But do not confuse it with devotion to persons, this vain and useless bauble of weak-minded intellectuals”. (Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Comrade Shatunovsky (August 1930), in: ‘Works’, Volume 13; Moscow; 1955; p. 20)

and in a talk in December 1931 with the German writer Emil Ludwig:

“Decisions of individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided deisions… Out of every 100 decisions taken by individual persons without being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 90 are one-sided”. (Josef V. Stalin: Talk with the German Author Emil Ludwig, in: ‘Works’, Volume 13; Moscow; 1955; p. 109).

In contrast, Kimilsungism holds the leader to be the the determinator of policy, to whom loyalty is a cardinal necessity:

“The party’s line and policies, strategy and tactics, are put forward by the leader… The leader is the supreme controller of the party, and the party’s leadership is precisely his leadership. Remaining unwaveringly loyal to the leader … is a natural communist obligation”. . (Kim Jong Il: ‘The Workers’ Party of Korea is a Juche-type Party …’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 86, 96, 106).

“The leader … plays the decisive role in shaping the destiny of the popular masses… Loyalty to the leader is the highest expression of the party, working-class and people-oriented spirit”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea’ in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 160).

“The revolutionary struggle is conducted under the guidance of the leader and in accordance with his ideas and will… The more we are faithful to the leader’s ideology and will, … the more worthy a life … we shall enjoy”.(Kim Jong Il: ‘On Establishing the Juche Outlook on the Revolution’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 195).

This anti-Marxist-Leninist conception gave rise to an exagggerated cult of the personality of both Kim Il Sung and his son and designated successor Kim Jong Il:

“The personality cult as practised in North Korea is unparalleled. For example, birthdays for both Kims are internationally celebrated. The 1992 celebration of Kim Il Sung’s 80th birthday required many working days of preparation by thousands of people, young and old, and lasted well into May. The cost was estimated to be almost $1 billion, including many millions spent on some 3,000 performing artists from eighty different countries”. (Pong S. Lee: ‘The North Korean Economy: Challenges and Prospects’, in: Sung Yeung Kwack (Ed.): ‘The Korean Economy at a Crossroad: Development Prospects, Liberalisation and South-North Economic Integration’; Westport (USA); 1994; p. 183).

For example, Kim Il Sung’s biographer declares:

“The national histories of all countries tell of celebrated heroes and leaders. Looking through them all, it is hard to find any record that compares with such a national hero and outstanding leader as Comrade Kim Il Sung, who has rendered such distinguished service to the revolution of his own country and to the world revolution… Where else in history can you find another leader like him?… Where is there any such leader equipped with all these qualities, an outstanding leader with such rich experience that has performed the greatest revolutionary exploits even during the hurricane of the long-drawn revolution, to compare with our Comrade Kim Il Sung, equipped with the wisdom of genius and indomitable fighting spirit and stamina, profound revolutionary theory …?”. (Baik Bong: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 621, 633).

For his part, Kim Jong Il is described in a recent biography as

” … the great thinker and theoretician, outstanding genius of leadership, boundlessly benevolent teacher of the people, and the great man of the century”. (Choe In Su: ‘Kim Jong Il: The People’s Leader’, Volume 2; Pyongyang; 1991; p. 374).

Sometimes, indeed, it is implied that the Kims possess divinity. On the occasion of Kim Jong Il’s appointment as General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, the official Korean Central News Agency reported miraculous events around Mount Paektu, Kim Jong Il’s birthplace:

“At around 05.10, when the special communique informed the people of the election of General Kim Jong Il as General Secretary of the WPK, a coloured cloud appeared on Mt. Paektu… Its rims were dyed with seven colours… At that moment, mysterious sounds reminiscent of cheers and applause came from the surface of Lake Chon… Witnessing these wonderful natural phenomena, its inhabitants said that nature also celebrated Kim Jong Il’s election”. (Bulletin of Korean Central News Agency, 20 October 1997; p. 3).

JUCHE

From the 1930s on, the Workers’ Party of Korea increasingly used the term ‘Juche’ to describe its overall policy. This is a Korean word usually translated as

” … self-reliance”. (‘Europa World Year Book 1999′, Volume 2; London: 1999; p. 2,061).

According to Kim Jong Il, in June 1930 Kim Il Sung

” … explained the principles of the Juche idea at the Meeting of Leading Personnel of the Young Communist League and the Anti-Imperialist Youth League held at Kalun in June 1930″. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On the Juche Idea’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 13).

In its early years, Juche was officially defined as a development of Marxism-Leninism:

“The Juche idea inherits all the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism. … It does not abandon the ideological and theoretical achievements of Marxism- Leninism, but further develops and enriches them”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea’ in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 148-49).

However, the Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was amended in April 1992

” … in order to remove mention of Marxism-Leninism and to replace it with references to Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology”. (‘Keesing’s Record of World Events’, Volume 39; p. R73).

Article 3 of the new Constitution reads:

“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centred on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people”. (‘Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’; Pyongyang; 1993; p. 1).

The demagogic character of statements that the WPK’s policy is one of promoting ‘self-reliance’ is shown by its actual policy, from the 1980s on, of encouraging foreign investment, joint ventures with foreign capital, and the establishment of ‘special economic zones’ on the Chinese model:

Article 37 of the Constitution of the DPRK adopted in April 1992 declares:

“The State shall encourage institutions, enterprises and organisations in our country to joint ventures and cooperation of enterprise with foreign corporations and individuals”. (‘Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’; Pyongyang; 1993; p. 9).

The new Constitution, in fact,

” … encouraged foreign investment and guaranteed the rights and profits of foreigners operating in North Korea”. (‘Keesing’s Record of World Events’, Volume 39; p. R73)

and in October 1992 the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly approved Korea’s first law on foreign investment:

“The new law permitted foreign investors to establish equity and contractual joint ventures within the country, and to set up and operate wholly foreign-owned enterprises in special economic zones. Foreign companies would be able to remit part of their profits abroad”. (‘Keesing’s Record of World Events’,Volume 38: p. 141-42).

Then, in 1991,

” … the government announced the creation of a special economic zone (SEZ) totalling 621 square kilometres . . ., expanded in March 1993 … to 742 square kilometres, … A spate of additional laws followed, stablishing the legal framework for foreign firms operating in North Korea”. (Marcus Noland: ‘Prospects for a North Korean External Economic Opening’, in: Thomas H. Henriksen & Jongryn Mo (Eds.): ‘North Korea After Kim Il Sung’; Stanford (USA); 1997; p. 55-56).

“About 80 joint ventures have been established in North Korea. Most of them are run by Korean residents of Japan”, (Dae-Ho Bryn: ‘North Korea’s Foreign Policy: The Juche Ideology and the Challenge of Gorbachev’s New Thinking’; Seoul; 1991; p. 223).

Degeneration into Philosophical Idealism The pretext given by Kimilsungism for revising Marxism is that ‘it is now obsolete’:

“Marxism … represented the era when the working class had emerged in the historical arena and was waging a struggle against capital. … But the times have changed and history has developed, so Marxism has acquired inevitable historical limitations”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘The Historical Lesson in Building Socialism and the General Line of Our Party’ , in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 293-94).

The main factor in this change is alleged to be the fact that it is now not objective conditions, but man that plays the decisive role in history:

“It is not objective conditions but man that plays the decisive role in the development of history”. (Kim Song Il: ‘On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995: p. 144).

But Marxism regards the laws of science, including the laws of economics, as proceeding objectively, independently of the will of man:

“Marxism regards laws of science — whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy — as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, utilise them in the interests of society, but he cannot change or abolish them. Still less can he form or create new laws of science”. (Josef V. Stalin: ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’; Tirana; 1979;p. 545).

Thus, to Marxist-Leninists freedom is not freedom from the operation of the laws of nature, but the recognition of these laws, the ‘appreciation of necessity’:

“Freedom is the appreciation of necessity. … Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natual laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends”. (Friedrich Engels: ‘Herr Eugen Duhring’s Revolution in Science (Anti-Duhring); New York; 1939; p. 125).

“What can this ‘appreciation of necessity’ mean? It means that, having come to know objective laws (‘necessity’), man will apply them with full consciousness”. ‘(Josef V. Stalin: ‘Ecomomic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’, in: ‘Selected Works’; Tirana; 1979; p. 546).

In contrast, Kimilsungism presents man as being above the laws of biology:

“Unlike biological beings, man is the master and transformer of, master of the world. He shapes his destiny on his own by transforming the objective world to meet his needs”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang; 1994; p. 12).

Thus, Kimilsungism presents man as free from the operation of the laws of nature:

“Man … is a social being with independence, … whereas all other material lives maintain their existence through subordination and adaptation to the objective world. … On the strength of this quality, man throws off the fetters of nature”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On the Juche Idea’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 14, 15).

But this is to degenerate into philosophical idealism, which asserts

” … the primacy of spirit to nature”. (Friedrich Engels: ‘Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy’, in: Karl Marx: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 1; London; 1943; p. 431). that is, in respect of ” … the relation of thinking and being”, (Friedrich Engels: ibid.; p. 430).

The primacy of the former, that is, the primacy of mind over matter. According to Kimilsungism, unlike the lower animals, man is not bound by the laws of nature:

“Animals are part of nature and their destiny is determined by the natural laws of change and development, whereas man… is not a being which obeys the natural laws of change and development”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On Some Problems of Education in the Juche Idea’, in: ‘On Carrying Foward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 144).

“Unlike all other living matter, which is subordinate to … the objective world, man dominates and transforms the world in accordance with his will and desire”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On Some Questions in Understanding the Juche Philosophy’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 5).

This idealist concept is embodied in the slogan of the Workers’ Party of Korea:

“When the Party is determined, we can do anything”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘Our Socialism centred on the Masses shall not Perish’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p, 289).

Furthermore, Marxism-Leninism holds that the mode of production determines the consciousness of man:

“The mode of production in material life determines the social, political and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”. (Karl Marx: Preface to: ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 1; London; 1943; p. 356).

“Marxism pointed the way to an all-embracing and comprehensive study of the process of rise, development and decline of social-economic formations. People make their own history. But … what are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all historical activity of man; what is the law of development of these conditions — to all this Marx drew attention and pointed out the way to a scientific study of history”. (Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘Karl Marx’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 11: London; 1943; p. 20).

This principle is what Lenin calls

“… the materialist conception of history”. (Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘Karl Marx’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 11; London; 1943; p. 19).

However, Kimilsungism rejects this fundamental facet of Marxism-Leninism:

“The theory of socialism in the preceding age, based on a materialist outlook on history, was not free from historical limitations. The theory did not regard the social and historical movement as a movement of the motive force . . ., but as a natural historical process which changes and develops due to material and economic factors… Seeing material and economic factors as fundamental in the revolutionary struggle, the preceding theory of socialism failed to raise the task of strengthening the motive force of the revolution and enhancing its role as the basic way to carry out the revolution”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang; 1994; p. 5-6).

The Rejection of Objective Class Categorisation

According to Marxism-Leninism, social class is an extremely important objective social category:

“Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation … to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of their share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different place they occupy in a definite system of social economy”. (Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘A Great Beginning’, in: ‘Collected Works’, Volume 29; London; 1974; p. 421).

But here again Kimilsungism degenerates into philosophical idealism. In place of the objective division of society into classes, it divides society into ‘the masses of the people’ and others, purely on the basis of the ideas they hold:

“The basic criterion for deciding whether one is a member of the masses of the people or not is not one’s social and class origin, but one’s ideas. … Anyone who loves the country, the people and the nation … is qualified to be a member of the masses of the people”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang; 1994; p. 19).

In line with this philosophical idealism, Kimilsungism rejects the Marxist-Leninist principle that the Party should lay primary stress on changing the objective conditions of society:

“In the past, the founders of Marxism evolved socialist theory by putting the main stress on material and economic conditions”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang: 1994; p. 8).

Kimilsungism gives priority to the ideological remoulding of man:

“In socialist society, the transformation of man, his ideological remoulding, becomes a more important and primary task than that of creating the material and economic condtions of socialism” (Kim Jong Il: ‘Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang; 1994; p. 7).

Indeed, according to Kimilsungism, the ‘frustration’ of socialism in many countries was due, not to the penetration of the international communist movement by revisionism but to the failure to give priority to the ideological remoulding of the masses of the people:

“The basic reason for the frustration of socialism in some countries is that they did not put the main emphasis on strengthening the motive force for building socialism and on enhancing its role”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘The Historical Lesson in Building Socialism and the General Line of Our Party’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang: 1995; p. 293).

and Kimilsungism defines

” … the driving force of social movement” (Kim Jong Il: Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang; 1994; p. 7)

as

” … the popular masses”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘Socialism is a Science’; Pyongyang: 1995; p. 7).

Rejection of Marxist-Leninist Principles of Distribution Marx held that it was essential that under socialism, the lower phase of communist society, workers should be given the material incentive of payment according to the quantity and quality of work performed:

“What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary, as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society … exactly what he has given to it. What he has given to it is his individual amount of labour, … The same amount of labour which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another”. (Karl Marx: ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 2; London; 1943; p. 563).

But Kimilsungism denounces Marx’s position on this question as ‘anti-socialist and revisionist’, and demands that, under socialism, priority is given to political and moral incentives:

“The position of giving prominence only to the material incentive for labour can be attributed to the neglect of the communist character of socialist society. … Those who regard material incentive as the most important demand that the system of material incentive be introduced into the whole economic framework. They claim that stimulating the working people materially is the most effective method for encouraging their enthusiasm for increasing production and developing the economy rapidly. They argue that even after the establishment of the socialist system the remnants of the old ideology left over from the exploiter society remain to a large degree in the minds of workers. … This is anti-socialist and revisionist theory. … If we raise the question of which to lay emphasis on, . . . the political and moral incentive should be stressed”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘On Having a Correct Understanding of the Political, Moral and Material Incentives’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 1; Pyongyang; 1992; p. 211).

Opposition to an International Marxist-Leninist Organisation Contrary to Marxist-Leninist principles, Kimilsungism opposes the revival of an international Marxist-Leninist organisation:

“Times have changed and the days are gone forever when the communist movement needed an authoritative international centre. … This provides no room for the existence of any international ‘centre’. … Therefore, declared Comrade Kim Il Sung, no such relationship should be permitted to arise within the international communist movement”. (Baik Bong: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 600-01).

And brushes aside the achievements of the former Communist International:

“The time is long past when there was one centre in the international communist movement and individual parties acted as its branches. … In the past … the parties of some socialist countries did great harm to the development of the international communist movement by failing to rid themselves of the customs of the Communist International. The party of a certain country claimed to be the ‘centre’ of the international communist movement and ordered other parties to do this or that. It acted without hesitation to put pressure on other parties and interfere in their internal affairs if they refused to follow its line, even though it was a wrong one”. (Kim Jong Il: ‘The Historical Lesson in Building Socialism and the General Line of Our Party’, in: ‘On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea’; Pyongyang; 1995; p. 301).

CONCLUSION

Comrade Hudson’s claim that the Workers’ Party of Korea made a ‘more thoroughgoing and mature’ critique of revisionism than that which was made by the Party of Labour of Albania cannot be reconciled with known facts.

Indeed, Kimilsungism’s characterisation of the differences in the international communist movement borders on the farcical:

“The differences of opinions between the fraternal parties and fraternal countries … are of a transitory character which come from the difference in the historical and geographical conditions of the socialist countries. . . . The differences are an ideological and theoretical divergence between class brothers who have the same political and economic basis and who struggle against imperialism and colonialism for the same goal of building socialism and communism”. (Baik Bong: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 595).

IN FACT, AN ANALYSIS OF THE OUTLOOK OF THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF KOREA MAKES IT CLEAR THAT KIMILSUNGISM OR JUCHE IS ITSELF A BRAND OF REVISIONISM ELABORATED TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS OF A COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRY LIKE KOREA, A BRAND OF REVISIONISM WHICH AIMS TO HOLD THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AT THE STAGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND PREVENT IT FROM GOING FORWARD TO THE STAGE OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.

The Communist League: Response to ‘Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?’

For the original article, “Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?” look here.

Dear Comrades,

Our delegate has reported to us the decision of the ‘Committee for the Marxist-Leninist Party’ to publish in the Committee’s journal the article entitled ‘Why Did The Soviet Union Collapse?’ the author of which is Comrade Ted Talbot, a former member of the Committee.

We have now read and considered the article concerned, and we give below some of the reasons why we consider that this article is contrary to established and agreed Marxist-Leninist principles. We feel that the article should not be published unless together with a critical commentary.

The ‘Traitors Thesis’

The article concerned begins by attacking what its calls the ‘traitors thesis’, which, according to the article,

“… . at its crudest.. .argues that the USSR was on track for socialism until the death of Stalin when a group of traitors to socialism, who had managed to worm their way into the top echelons of the Party, took control”. (Why did the Soviet Union collapse?’ p.1).

The article attributes this thesis to Cathy Majid, apparently on the basis that attacks on its content will be more acceptable if it is said to emanate from a source whom members of the Committee have learned from their own experience to distrust.

In fact, since the 1960s this so-called ‘traitors thesis’ has been a key thesis dividing Marxist-Leninists from revisionists.

At this time, for example, the ‘People’s Daily’, the principal organ of the Communist Party of China, published the seminal article ‘Leninism or Social Imperialism?’ which stated:

“How was it possible for the restoration of capitalism to take place in the Soviet Union… and.. .to become social-imperialist? If we examine the question from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism,… . we shall be able to understand that this was mainly. . . the result of the usurpation of the Party and government leadership by a handful of Party persons in power taking the capitalist road”.

(‘Leninism or Social Imperialism?’, in: David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann: ‘People’s China: Social Experimentation, Politics, Entry onto the World Scene: 1966 through 1972′; New York; 1974; p. 454).

By October 1964, the differences between tile Soviet and Chinese parties had become, in the words of the Albanian Marxist-Leninist leader Enver Hoxha,

“…this great historic battle between Marxism and revisionism”.

(Enver Hoxha: ‘An Open Letter to the Members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 3; Tirana; 1980; p. 631).

In his letter to the Committee dated 4 August 1998, Comrade Powell (Comrade Talbot’s close collaborator) endorses this characterisation, speaking of

“…the great struggle waged by the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania during the 1950s and 60s against Soviet-style revisionism”.

(Harry Powell: Letter to Committee of 4 August 1998; p. 1).

And chides the ‘Partisan’ comrades for allegedly having been

“…enthusiastic supporters of Soviet social imperialism right up until its final collapse in the early 1990s”.

(Harry Powell: Letter to Committee of 4 August 1998; p. 1).

At the recent Congress of the ‘Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, Viktor Ampilov endorsed the ‘traitors thesis’, declaring that

“The break up of the first state of workers and farmers in the world started with the revisionism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union”.

(Viktor Ampilov: Political Statement at the Congress of the CPSU. In: ‘North Star Supplement’; p. 1).

and in a lecture at Kim 11 Sung University in Pyongyang in October 1992, Nina Andreyeva, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Bolshevik Communist Party, declared that the AUBOP held

“… the degradation of the CPSU into Right opportunism and revisionism started from the end of the 50s when the leadership of the Party and state was seized by Khrushchev and his associates. The starting point of the degeneration of the CPSU into opportunism was its 20th Congress”.

(Nina Andreyeva: Lecture at Kim Ii Sung University, Pyongyang (6 October 1992), in:

‘Unpresented Principles’; Leningrad; 1992; p. 305).

Thus, the so-called ‘traitors thesis’ is completely in accord with the general outlook of’ the International Communist Movement.

We must, therefore, draw the Committee’s attention to a paper submitted to the December 1997 conference of the organisation ‘International Struggle – Marxist Leninist’ by Ted Talbot and Harry Powell, which lays down the following important principle for ‘a serious pre-party grouping’, namely that

“…at the initial stage of its existence,.. .certain basic theoretical principles need to be agreed. In particular adherence to the general outlook of the International Communist Movement”.

(Ted Talbot and Harry Powell: ‘International Struggle – Marxist-Leninist’, No 4, 1998; p. 41).

The article ‘Why did the Soviet Union collapse?’ is in clear violation of that principle.

Bill Bland: Albania in 1984

“ALBANIA – 1984″ BY BILL BLAND

Some weeks ago I received, through the Albanian Embassy in Paris, an invitation to visit the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania as the guest of the Committee for Cultural and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries, and I set out from London on June 18th.

Perhaps as punishment for going to Albania, the weekly plane from Belgrade has a check-in time of 5.40 a.m. The night porter at the hotel where I passed the night in Belgrade told me that he was really a priest, but worked during the week to augment his meagre income. When he handed me my passport at four o’clock in the morning, he asked me where I was bound so early. When I told him, he shook his head sadly and said: “An ungodly hour for an ungodly country!” “Maybe”, I said, “but the only country I know where you can leave your wallet lying around and know that it will be there when you go back!”

I was greeted warmly at Rinas by Theofan Nishku, in charge of relations with friendship societies abroad. Later in the day I met the Committee’s new President, Jorgo Melica, who spoke highly of the Society’s work and arranged a programme for my visit which met my every request. I visited Korça, Shkodra, Gjirokastra and Saranda, while Mr. Nishku himself was good enough to spend the whole of my last weekend with me at Durrës. My interpreter was a pleasant young school teacher named Viktor Ristani, while my driver, Hodo Meçe steered carefully past every child and chicken. He was extremely proud of his new Volvo, which he polished at every opportunity and was outraged when, visiting the construction site of the new power-station at Koman on the River Drin, it became spattered with mud.

Albania is changing rapidly, and I noticed many new constructions since my last visit two years ago – from the new ornamental pond with its fountains opposite the Hotel Dajti in Tirana to the impressive Skanderbeg Museum in Kruja, which tells the story of Albania’s national hero in a vivid and artistic way.

In the Greek Minority Area

One of the most interesting experiences of my tour was a visit to the Greek minority in the south. Our first stop here was the village of Goranxi, which lies in the shadow of Mali i Gjere (Wide Mountain). It forms part of the higher-type cooperative farms of Lower Dropull, which embraces 17 villages with a total population of 10,500. I was entertained with raki and llokume (the latter being Albanian “Turkish Delight”) in the comfortable, beautifully-furnished home of Pano Tashi, a retired cooperative farmer, and his family. I recorded a long interview with Mr. Tashi. He asserted that the numbers of the Greek minority in Albania were nothing like the figure of 400,000 put forward by the Greek government, although – at 50,000 – it was in fact somewhat larger than the figure given to me on an earlier visit to the country. He ridiculed the stories being put forward by the Greek government to the effect that the Greek minority was “oppressed”. He showed me copies of the Greek-language daily newspaper, “Llajko Vima” (The People’s Voice); this is a specially prepared edition of the country’s leading newspaper of the same name “Zëri i Popullit,” it has a weekly literary supplement devoted entirely to poems and short stories by Greek-speaking writers. He also presented me with several books for adults and children published in the Greek language, and told me with evident pride of the Greek amateur dramatic societies and folk ensembles which flourished in the district, and described some of the films from Greece which he had seen in the past few months.

I asked him about the educational system in the minority area, and he told me of the Greek teachers’ training college in Gjirokastra from which his daughter-in-law had graduated before becoming a teacher in the village eight-year school. Here for the first three years education was conducted entirely in the Greek language; in the fourth year the child was taught the elements of Albanian grammar, and from the fifth year onwards education was carried out principally in Albanian, but with periods devoted to Greek language and literature. In this way the child became bilingual and was able to proceed to secondary or higher education (which is conducted in Albanian) and could undertake any occupation. In fact, I had already discovered in Tirana that members of the minority occupied some of the highest positions in the land – as, for example, the woman Vice-President of the People’s Assembly, Vitori Çurri.

As for the alleged “poverty” of the Greek community, he pointed out that Dropull was one of the richest areas of Albania, and said that out of the 190 families in the village, 122 had TV sets and 110 had washing-machines.

Thus, he said, there was not the slightest discrimination against the minority, whose culture was encouraged in every way, and members of the Greek community had equal rights in every way with the majority. Asked to say a few final words, he declared that he would never forget that the British people were allies of the Albanian people in the war and he hoped that the two peoples would always remain friends.

I was told that I was welcome to visit any other house in the village where someone was at home (all but pensioners and recent mothers being at work) to confirm what Mr. Nashi had told me, but I was completely satisfied with his sincerity and did not take advantage of the offer.

In the next village – Dervician – I was shown over the new Palace of Culture with an art gallery, library, restaurant – not to mention a theatre, equipped with a revolving stage, seating 470. And this was in a village with a population of just under 2,000!

The Penal System

I had asked particularly for detailed information concerning the operation of the penal system in the PSR of Albania, which is the subject of much misinformation in the British press. In this connection Paskal Haxhi, a judge of the Supreme Court, was good enough to accord me two long interviews in which he answered all my questions fully and presented me with several books on the subject. When translated, these and all that Mr. Haxhi (himself, incidentally, a member of the Greek minority) told me will be the subject of an article on the subject in ALBANIAN LIFE.

Among the most interesting facts which emerged was that the police in Albania have the duty of preventing or checking the commission of a crime, but have no power of arrest or of investigation. In the case of a suspected crime, they have power only to establish the identity of any persons they believe to be involved (including possible witnesses) and to report to an investigating magistrate, who alone may investigate and order an arrest.

The amount of crime in Albania, particularly serious crime, is very small as a result, said Mr. Haxhi, of the elimination of many of the social causes of criminality and most cases of petty crime are dealt with outside the courts by public criticism, etc. During the whole of 1982, for example, only 111 people in the whole of Albania (7% of them women) were sentenced to some penalty for criminal offences, and the great majority of these penalties did not involve deprivation of liberty. Of sentences of detention, the majority were of re-education (which is the kernel of the penal system) in labour camps, and only very serious or repeated crimes were the subject of a prison sentence, for which Albania has two small prisons. He was adamant that there was no truth whatsoever in stories, largely circulated by politically hostile émigrés, that detainees were subject to inadequate diet or ill-treatment, which would obviously defeat the fundamental aim of re-education. Prisoners had the right of complaint to the Attorney-General’s Office, and all complaints had to be investigated. Further, he – like other judges – visited labour camps and prisons regularly to investigate the progress of his “patients” and could order the cancellation of a remaining sentence where he was satisfied that re-education had been accomplished. It was interesting to discover that detainees in labour camps (but not in prisons) had the right to sexual relations with their wives or husbands during the two-monthly family visits, special accommodation being provided for this.

The death sentence, Mr. Haxhi stated, was a temporary and extraordinary measure applied only in the case of extremely serious crimes such as treason and where it was considered that re-education was unlikely to be successful. No death sentences had been passed in Albania so far during 1984.

Other Interviews

Shortly after my arrival in the country, I was privileged to meet Ali Xhiku, the Dean of the Faculty of History and Linguistics at the University of Tirana, and Professor Shaban Demiraj, who holds the Chair in Albanian Language and Literature. They were delighted to hear from me that the University of London had been granted funds to open an Albanian Department and asked me to convey to Dr. Deletant the offer to help with the provision of books or in any other way. I had been working for some time on a biographical sketch of an Englishman, John Newport, who fought with Skanderbeg, and they arranged a further interview with specialists in this field to help me track down the source of a quotation from him which is cited in the “History of Albania”. As a result it is now clear that the original source is not to be found in Albania and I have to search elsewhere.

I met Vaso Pano, the Director of ALBTURIST, and discussed ways and means of finding a less expensive route for British tourists to reach Albania than by air via Yugoslavia, and one less exhausting than the long journey by coach. Of course, when the Yugoslavs have completed their section of the railway which will link the Albanian rail network with the rest of Europe, this will provide one possibility. The main stumbling block to a quick and relatively inexpensive tourist route from Britain to Albania (via Corfu, for example) is that the Greek government (which regards itself as still in a state of war with Albania) will not, as yet, permit travel to that country other than by air. Nevertheless, Mr. Pano welcomed the first tour to his country organised by the Albanian Society and assured me that he would do everything possible to make this visit an interesting one.

I met two leaders of the Trade Unions of Albania -Qirjako Mino and Islam Bashari – and obtained from them much information on the trade union movement which is the subject of a separate article in this issue of ALBANIAN LIFE. They were also good enough to give me material, including badges, requested by the Museum of Labour History in London. They were extremely well-informed about the miners’ strike in Britain, which has been fully reported in the Albanian media.

Another interesting meeting was with Fuad Dushku, the Director of the Gallery of Arts in Tirana, with whom I had a long discussion on the principles of socialist realist art. He is arranging to send to the Society a set of specially-taken colour slides of representative paintings and sculptures exhibited in the gallery.

My final meetings were with Hiqmet Arapi, Vice-Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, and with Estref Bega, Director of the Book Enterprise. With them I discussed ways and means of improving trade between our two countries. I had brought with me several suggestions from Ramsey Margolis of the Albania-General Trading Co. Ltd., (who, I discovered, is remembered throughout Albania as “the vegetarian”) on ways of making Albanian products (especially books) more acceptable to the British market. They expressed pleasure at receiving these constructive suggestions and promised to pass them on to the appropriate quarters. I came away loaded with catalogues, and samples of most products – from chrome ore and postage stamps to jam and wine – will shortly be on their way to Mr. Margolis.

Diversions

My trip was by no means all work, however. I visited numerous art exhibitions, saw the visiting Greek folk song and dance ensemble on television and, on one free evening in Tirana, went to the cinema. I found all seats booked for the latest Albanian film “The Judgement”, even though it was being screened simultaneously at several cinemas. I took myself off, therefore, to the little Agimi (Dawn) Cinema nearby, and saw an Italian film of Donizetti’s opera “Lucia di Lammermoor”. It was screened without subtitles, but with a synopsis in Albanian before each act. My ticket (there was only one price) cost 1 lek 50 qindarke – the equivalent of 15 English pence, and I could not but compare this with the £2.50 it would have cost me to see the same film in London.

My ever-solicitous guide and mentor Viktor Ristani insisted that in view of my great age I should rest for four hours each afternoon. I pleaded that this was a waste of time. I reminded him that, because of our atrocious climate, the siesta was not an English custom. I quoted the old Lancashire proverb: “There’s time enough to rest when you’re under the sod”. I told him that I was really only twenty-six and that my decrepit appearance was simply the result of a dissolute life. But all in vain! All this, he replied, made a siesta even more necessary! In consequence, I was free in the afternoons to wander around wherever we happened to be, searching for books, music, etc. to add to the Society’s collection. On one of these trips I discovered a manual of names of Albanian and Illyrian origin and, finding that the name of “Viktor” was not among them, I informed him gravely that he was required to change this by December 1st to “Jaseminë”. He seemed to find this shaka angleze (English joke) amusing.

One of the great personal pleasures of my trip was to meet in person the sports commentator and novelist Skifter Këlliçi, whose novel “The Last Days of a Prime Minister” I had just finished translating into English. Another was to meet again Faik Zeneli, who had been my interpreter on my first visit to Albania in 1962, since when he has been Counsellor in Rome and later Ambassador to Tanzania; he is now a Party functionary in his beloved home town of Shkodra, from where he was good enough to escort me to the Perlat Rexhepi State Farm, the Koman dam and several museums.

Reading back over what I have written, I realise that I shall be chided by my old Orkney friend John Broom for not having mentioned any negative features of life in Albania. The fact that I have to think hard to recall any such features of which I became aware is no doubt evidence that my overall impression was extremely favourable. But yes! Although food is plentiful and its distribution seems wholly adequate (there are food shops in almost every block open, on a shift system, from early morning till late at night) I found it difficult in the towns to buy soap powder. This may have been due to my not knowing precisely which type of shop sold it (a kinkaleri, which sells much more than trinkets, a “household goods” shop, a “various goods” shop, etc.). There seems to be no actual shortage of soap powder (at least, Albanian clothes appear spotlessly clean) and I eventually obtained a packet at one of those village stores which sell everything.

Conclusion

On my last evening in Albania I was the guest at a huge seven-course banquet kindly given in my honour by Mr. Melica, which even my capacious stomach could not accommodate.

My final act before catching the plane back to “Christian civilisation” was to be interviewed by radio and television on my impressions of Albania. I replied:

“My impressions are so many and varied that it is hard to summarise them in a few words.

But long after I have left your shores some things will remain vividly in my mind:

• the huge dam under construction at Koman;
• the breathtaking beauty of the Albanian landscape;
• the gaily-painted playgrounds and the beautiful, healthy children playing in them;
• the warm friendliness and hospitality of the Albanian people to those who come to their country as friends and not as enemies;
• the blend of the aromas of linden trees and roasting coffee which for me will always symbolise Shkodra at six o’ clock in the morning.

But long after all these memories have begun to fade with the passage of time, I shall recall the party I had the privilege of attending in the south. It was given by young people and their teachers to celebrate the former’s graduation. They were from Ksamil, where they and their parents have made the wilderness blossom with oranges and lemons. I noted that the girls would invite the boys to dance on equal terms with them – a little thing, but one which for me symbolises the liberation of women which has made such giant strides in Albania. I observed that their toasts to the Party of Labour and its leadership were spontaneous and sincere, and this should not surprise people who are aware of the doors now open to these young people which in the past stood firmly closed. For several hours after I was supposed to leave I stayed on to listen to the throb of Albania’s over-powering folk music and to watch with the greatest pleasure as these young people laughed, sang and danced together. It seemed to me that here was embodied in real life the slogan which stands off the beach at Durrës:

‘Beautiful is the life we have created,

but brighter still will be the future’”

(reprinted from Albanian Life, n. 29, 2/1984)

Bill Bland: The Market Under Socialism

ALLIANCE
May 2005

Introductory Note

With the permission of the Committee of the Stalin Society, I am circulating to members a statement on the present situation in Albania by another former Secretary of the Albanian Society and myself. An Albanian translation is being circulated underground by Albanian Marxist—Leninists.

I am taking the opportunity at the same time to circulate a clarification and amplification of the points I made in the discussion which followed Ella Rule’s excellent paper on Stalin’s Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’.

W. B. Bland

THE MARKET UNDER SOCIALISM

Is there a Market under Socialism?

It was suggested during the discussion that the term ‘market’ had relevance only to a capitalist society.

But the dictionary defines the term ‘market’ as

“. . demand (for a commodity)”.
(‘Oxford English Dictionary’, Volume 9; Oxford; 1979; p. 305).

and the term ‘demand’ as

“a call for a commodity on the part of consumers”.
(‘Oxford English Dictionary’, Volume 4; Oxford; 1979; p. 430).

But in a socialist society, as in a capitalist society, people possess varying sums of money which they spend in shops on commodities which are on sale. This willingness and ability to expend money on commodities constitutes demand, constitutes a market.

Clearly, both in a capitalist society and in socialist society there is a ‘market’, for commodities.

Distribution under Socialism

Distribution is

“…the dispersal among consumers of commodities produced.”
(‘Oxford English Dictionary’, Volume 4; Oxford; 19009; p. 8S3).

The principle on which distribution is carried out under socialism is that:

“The right of producers is proportional to the labour they supply”.
(K. Marx: ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’, in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 2; London; 1943; p. 564)

that is, incomes are proportional to — the distribution of commodities is geared to — the quantity and quality of work performed.

Marx admits that distribution of commodities according to work performed is not completely fair, is not distribution completely according to need. He points out:

“One man is superior to another physically or mentally, and so supplies more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer time…Further, one worker is married, another not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth…

But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society”.
(K. Marx: ibid.; p. 654, 565).

Nevertheless, this is the nearest that a socialist society can get to a completely fair system of distribution, the nearest that a socialist society can get to distribution according to need. And it is a much fairer system of distribution than is a capitalist society, where the purchasing power of one whole section of society — the capitalist class — depends primarily on the quantity of means of production owned.

According to Stalin:

“…the basic economic law of socialism…(requires) the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society”.
(J. V. Stalin: ‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’; Moscow; 1952; p. 45).

For the word ‘requirements’, we may substitute the word ‘needs’:

“REQUIREMENT: that which is required or needed; a…need”.
(‘Oxford English Dictionary’) Volume 13; Oxford; 1989: p. 682).

Since it is not possible under socialism for even the essential needs of society to be fully satisfied, the principle of distribution according to work performed fulfills Stalin’s criterion of a socialist society by achieving the maximum possible satisfaction of the needs of society.

Only after socialism has given way to communism can a completely fair principle of distribution be introduced — the principle

“…to each according to his needs…”
(V. I. Lenin: ‘The State and Revolution’, in: ‘Works’, Volume 7; London; 1937; p. 88).

This principle of distribution is possible only when the productive forces have been developed to the point where there is an abundance of the necessaries of life and when people’s attitude to work has changed from that which existed under capitalism; that is:

“when people have become so accustomed to observing the

fundamental rules of social life and when their labour is so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their ability…”
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 88).

Because distribution according to work performed gives a material incentive to workers to maximise production, it advances society as quickly as possible the requirement for communism of ‘an abundance of the necessaries of life’.

Of course, distribution according to need under communism can never be absolute. While we may say that communism has been attained when all the necessities of life can be distributed according to need, the productive forces will continue to be developed and new needs will arise which can at first be satisfied only on a rationed basis, e.g., on the socialist principle in accordance with work performed.

Planned Production under Socialism

According to Stalin, as has been said:

“…the basic economic law of socialism…(requires)…securing the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society”.
J.V. Stalin: op. cit,.; p. 45).

Bill Bland on “Stalinism”

‘STALINISM’

An Address to the Sarat Academy in London

on 30 April 1999 by Bill Bland

I am grateful to the Sarat Academy for inviting me to speak to you on ‘Stalinism’.

However, your choice of subject presented me with some difficulty, since I am a great admirer of Stalin and the word ‘Stalinism’ was introduced by concealed opponents of Stalin – in particular by Nikita Khrushchev – in preparation for later political attacks upon him.

Today, in fact, ‘Stalinism’ has become a meaningless term of abuse employed to denote political views with which one disagrees. The Conservative press sometimes even describes Tony Blair as a ‘Stalinist’ -giving Stalin, were he still alive, ample grounds for a libel action!

Stalin always referred to himself modestly as ~a pupil of Lenin’ and shall follow his example and interpret the subject of ‘Stalinism’ as ‘Marxism-Leninism

Perhaps the nearest figure to Stalin in British history is Richard the Third, whom everybody ‘knows’ – and I put the word ‘knows’ in inverted commas – from their school history books and Shakespeare to have been a cruel, deformed monster who murdered the little princes in the Tower.

It is only comparatively recently that serious historians have begun to realise that the commonly accepted portrayal of Richard was drawn by his Tudor successors, who had seized the throne from him and killed him.

Naturally, they then proceeded to rewrite the chronicles to justify their usurpation of the throne – even altering his portraits to present him as physically deformed, as a physical as well as a moral monster. In other words, the picture of Richard which has become generally accepted today was the result not of historical truth, but of the propaganda of his political opponents.

It is, therefore, legitimate to ask: is the picture of Stalin presented to us by so-called ‘Kremlinologists’ historical fact or mere propaganda?

The ‘Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (the Soviet Union), which was constructed under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, no longer exists. Is it therefore true to say – as many people do – that this means that socialism in the Soviet Union failed?

I intend to quote here only one set of statistics. Tn his report to the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1939, Stalin cited figures from Western sources on the growth of industrial output in various countries as compared with 1913. These figures were:

Germany: —24.6%
Britain: —14.8%
USA: +10.2%
USSR: +291.9%

Indeed, it is an undisputed fact under the centrally planned economy instituted under Stalin, Russia was transformed in a few decades from a backward agrarian country into an advanced industrial country which by 1941— 45 had become powerful enough to defeat a German aggression able to draw upon the resources of the whole of Western Europe.

It is common to hear Stalin described as a ‘dictator.”

The strongly anti-Soviet American writer Eugene Lyons once asked Stalin directly: ‘Are you a dictator?’ Lyons goes on (and I quote:)

“Stalin smiled, implying that the question was on the preposterous side.

‘No’, he said slowly, ‘I am no dictator. Those who use the word do not understand the Soviet system of government and the methods of the Communist Party. No one man or group of men can dictate. Decisions are made by the Party”.

Book Review: “Stalin’s Letters to Molotov: 1925-1936″

‘STALIN’S LETTERS TO MOLOTOV : 1925 – 1936′

(Edited by Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov & Oleg V. Khlevniuk)

(Published by Yale University Press, New Haven (USA), 1995)

Introduction

In December 1969, Stalin’s comrade-in-arms Vyacheslav Molotov turned over to the Central Party Archive at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism seventy-nine letters written to him by Stalin between 1925 and 1936. The documents are now located in the ‘Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History in: fond 558, opis 1, delo 5388.

The Russian editors point out the

“… fragmentary nature”

(Russian Editors: Preface: Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov & Oleg V. Khlevniuk (Eds.): ‘Stalin’s Letters to Molotov: 1925-1936′; New Haven (USA); 1995; p. xiv).

of the correspondence, noting that

“… the period from 1931 through 1936 is represented by only a few documents. Letters from other years (notably 1928) are missing altogether. It is not known whether Molotov turned over all the documents in his possession or only a portion of them”.

(Russian Editors: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.); ibid.; p. xiv).

Nevertheless,

“… the letters preserved contain unparalleled information”,

(Russian Editors: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. xiv).

particularly since they were not written with publication in view.

Lenin’s Testament

Perhaps the most interesting section of the book covers the so-called ‘Lenin’s Testament – a letter dictated by Lenin at the end of December 1922. during his last illness.

“In accordance with his (Lenin’s — Ed.) wishes, the letter was read out to the delegates of the 13th Party congress, held from May 23 to 31, 1924. The Congress unanimously decided that the letter should not be published … since it was addressed to the Congress and not intended for publication”.

(Note to: Vladimir I. Lenin: Last Letters and Articles; Moscow; 1971; p. 63).

In 1925 the American Trotskyist Max Eastman published ‘Since Lenin died’, which contained what were alleged to be extracts from the document concerned. However, in his Introduction, editor Lars Lih admits that Eastman’s book seriously distorted, for political motives, the content of the document:

“Previous Western interpretations have all accepted that Eastman’s book ‘correctly reproduced long extracts’ of the Testament. On reading ‘Since Lenin died’, I was surprised to find this was far from true. Not only does Eastman give a highly distorted rendition of the Testament, but the distortions all clearly serve an explicit political purpose…

‘Since Lenin died’ is an inaccurate, highly politicised account that contrasts Trotsky, with his ‘saintly’ devotion to the revolution, to all the other leaders of the party, who are nothing more than unscrupulous usurpers”

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 20-21).

Eastman claimed that his book was based on

“… his ‘chats’ with Comrade Trotsky about Lenin’s so-called testament and about the ‘main figures in the Central Committee’”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, Russian Communist Party (17 June 1925), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.: p. 71).

Consequently, on 17 June 1925, Stalin wrote to members of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the RCP saying that he was convinced that the purpose of Max Eastman’s book was

“… to discredit the government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, and that for these purposes Eastman indulges in a whole range of slanders and distortions.

I have no doubt whatsoever that Eastman’s book is libellous, that it will prove enormously profitable to the world counter-revolution (and has already done so!”), and that it will cause serious damage to the entire world revolutionary movement.”

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to PB and CCC (17 June 1925), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 73, 74).

Stalin proposed that, since

“… the silence of Com. Trotsky in this case may be construed only as a confirmation or an excuse for these distortions”,

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to PB and CCC (17 June 1925), in: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p.74).

Trotsky should be asked at least to refute certain statements in the book –among these the allegations that,

“… Trotsky’s true texts do not appear in public”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to PB and CCC (17 June 1925), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.) : ibid.; p.75).

and that the Party leaders had

“clapped the censorship on his’ (that is, Lenin’s -Stalin) ‘own last words to his Party”

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to PB and CCC (17 June 1925), in: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 75).

Accordingly, Stalin proposed that the Politburo should

PROPOSE TO COM. TROTSKY THAT HE DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF DECISIVELY FROM EASTMAN AND MAKE A STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS WITH A CATEGORICAL REBUTTAL OF AT LEAST THOSE DISTORTIONS THAT WERE OUTLINED ABOVE”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to PB and CCC (17 June 1925). in: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 81).

On the following day, 18 June 1925,

“… the Politburo affirmed Stalin’s proposal”, (Note to: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 82).

and

“… Trotsky himself promised that he would within three days submit the text of his statement”.

(Note to: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 82).

Later in June 1925, Trotsky sent to Stalin the draft of his statement, to which Stalin responded:

“If you are interested in my opinion, I personally consider the draft completely unsatisfactory”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Note to Lev Trotsky (June 1925), in: Note to: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 82).

Trotsky appealed to the Politburo, but

“…after meeting the usual rebuff, … he began to revise the text of his statement for the press… The final text of his statement was ready by 1 July 1925″.

(Note to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 82).

Trotsky’s statement read, in part, as follows:

“Eastman proceeds to conclusions that are completely and utterly directed against our Party and capable, if taken on faith, of discrediting the Party and Soviet power…

Eastman says that the Central Committee ‘hid’ from the Party a number of highly important documents that Lenin wrote in the last period of his life (letters on the national question, the so-called testament, and so forth): this cannot be termed anything other than a slander of the Central Committee of our Party. These letters give advice on matters of internal Party organisation, yet from Eastman’s words the conclusion could be drawn that Vladimir Ilyich meant them to be printed. In fact, this is completely untrue… It goes without saying that all these letters and proposals came to the attention of the addressees and to the knowledge of the delegates of the 13th Party Congress; … If they were not published, that is because their author did not intend for them to be published. Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any ‘testament’, and the character of his relation to the Party, not to mention the character of the Party itself, excludes the possibility of such a ‘testament’…

Eastman’s assertions that the Central Committee … held up my pamphlets in 1923 or 1924 or at any other time are false…

My relationship to Eastman differs in no way from my relationship to very many Communists or ‘sympathetic foreigners’ … – certainly no closer.

His book can be of service only to the most malicious enemies of communism and the revolution, and it is therefore, objectively speaking, a tool of counter-revolution”.

(Lev Trotsky: Statement published in ‘Bolshevik’, No. 16. 1925. in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 244, 245, 246, 247, 248).

It must be noted that Trotsky does not, as has been alleged, deny the existence of the document known as ‘Lenin’s Testament’:

“Trotsky’s point is that it is inappropriate to call Lenin’s letter a ‘testament’, in other words, a literal statement of last wishes that the party was beholden to carry out”.

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 22).

Manuilsky

On 16 July 1925, ‘L’Humanité’ (Humanity), the organ of the French Communist Party,

“… published the original version of Trotsky’s statement”

(note to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 83).

and on 27 July the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party passed the following resolution:

“a) To request ‘L’Humanité’ to publish a notice that the text of Com. Trotsky’s letter regarding Eastman’s book that appeared in ‘L’Humanité’ is incomplete and distorted.

b) To request ‘L’Humanité’ to publish the full (final) text of Com. Trotsky’s letter about Eastman’s book”.

(Note to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 83).

It became known that the original version of Trotsky’s statement had been deliberately leaked to ‘L’Humanité’ by the concealed revisionist Dmitri Manuilsky:

“Soon it became clear that the original version of Trotsky’s article had been given to ‘L’Humanité’ by D. Z. Manuilsky, a member of the Comintern’s Executive Committee presidium, during his trip to France”. (Note to; Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 83).

On 1 August 1925 Stalin wrote to Molotov:

“I was told that Manulisky sent ‘L’Humanité’ the first draft of Trotsky1s article for publication, not accidentally but on purpose. If that’s true, it’s an outrage. If it’s true, then we are dealing, not with a ‘mistake’, as you wrote me, but with the policy of a few people who for some reason, are not interested in publishing Trotsky’s article in its final edited version, This is unquestionably the case. The matter cannot be left as it is. I propose … condemning Manuilsky’s intolerable action”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (1 August 1925). in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 90).

On Manuilsky’s ‘excuse’ for his action, Stalin is characteristically blunt:

“The letter from Manuilsky is cowardly and conniving.

I stand entirely by my declaration on the swindling and dirty tricks, despite the dissatisfaction of some comrades”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (18 August 1925), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 94).

Dimitrov

The book contains only one reference to Manuilsky’s close collaborator, the concealed revisionist Georgi Dimitrov.

According to the researches of Dobrin Mitchev, of the Institute of History of the Communist Party of Bulgaria:

“On 10 March (1934 – Ed.) … Georgi Dimitrov wrote to Stalin. In his letter he explained that during the year he had spent in prison he had thought a great deal about the problems of the world workers’ movement. He had been concerned above all, he specified, with questions about the strategy and tactics, the methods, the action and the functioning of the Communist International.

“The discussion took place a little later, in the presence of Manuilsky and others.

In the course of the interview, Georgi Dimitrov explained, developed his ideas, which were contrary to those of Stalin. The discussion was ardent, difficult, impassioned”.

(Dobrin Mitchev, in: Jean Méroy: ‘Dimitrov: Un revolutionnaire de notre temps (Dimitrov: A Revolutionary of Our Time); Paris; 1972; p. 184-85).

On the 7th Congress of the Communist International, which took place in August 1935, Stalin comments unenthusiastically:

“The Comintern Congress wasn’t so bad”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (5 August 1935), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 237).

– meaning, apparently, that it was not so bad as might have been expected!

Litvinov

In his correspondence with Molotov, Stalin notes that the Soviet diplomat Maksim Litvinov, a concealed revisionist, did not see things in a revolutionary way:

“Litvinov does not see and is not interested in the revolutionary aspect of policy”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (29 August 1929), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 174).

and that he had irrational confidence in such people as the British social-democrat Edward Wise:

“Litvinov . . . believes Wise and other bastards more than the logic of things”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (9 September 1929), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 177-78).

In another letter, Stalin goes so far as to speak of Litvinov — along with Nikolai Bukharin and Aleksey Rykov, later convicted of treason — as unable to see the strength of the Soviet Union:

“Rykov, along with Bukharin and Litvinov, … don’t see the growth of the power and might of the USSR”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (7 October 1929). in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 182).

Krupskaya

On 14 December 1925, at the 14th Party Congress, Lenin’s revisionist widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya, said:

“We cannot reassure ourselves with the idea that the majority is always right. … Let us recall, for example, the Stockholm Congress (of 1906– Ed.)”.

(Nadezhda Krupskaya: Speech at 14th Party Congress (20 December 1925), in: Note to Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 117).

On which Stalin commented:

“Krupskaya is a splitter (see her speech about ‘Stockholm’ at the 14th Congress). She has to be beaten, as a splitter, if we want to preserve the unity of the Party”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (16 September 1926), in; Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 127).

Ordzhonikidze

In August 1933, a number of officials responsible for the production of agricultural machinery were tried before the USSR Supreme Court for sabotage — for having supplied combines without the full complement of parts. On 22 August USSR Deputy Prosecutor Andrei Vishinsky delivered a speech in which he criticised the departments of state concerned for

“… the immense failure of the work methods of some of the most important government institutions. I mean the Commissariat of Agriculture in the first place as represented by its agricultural supply agency… I mean the Commissariat of Heavy Industry as represented by its agricultural machine association”.

(Note to: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 233).

Vyshinsky’s statement angered Grigory (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze and Yakov Yakovlev, People’s Commissars of Heavy Industry and Agriculture respectively, and

“… in Stalin’s absence, they managed to persuade the Politburo to issue a resolution criticising Vyshinsky for his allegations: ‘To point out to Com. Vyshinsky that he should not have formulated his views in a way . . . that allows incorrect accusations to be made against Heavy Industry and Agriculture’”

(Note to: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 233-34).

On which Stalin commented:

“I consider Sergo’s actions with respect to Vyshinsky the behaviour of a hooligan. … By his act of protest Sergo clearly wished to disrupt the campaign of the Council of People’s Commissars and Central Committee to provide proper equipment”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (1 September 1933), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 233).

“The behaviour of Sergo (and Yakovlev) … can only be characterised as anti-Party’, since their objective is to defend reactionary Party elements against the Central Committee”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (12 September 1933),. in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 234).

Wrecking

The letters refute the myth that Stalin believed that persons charged with sabotage were innocent, as the American editor Lars Lih admits:

“The letters indicate that … Stalin genuinely believed that the wreckers were guilty as charged”.

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.); ibid.; p. 48).

and insisted on full publication of the testimonies of the accused and the secret service:

“We must immediately publish all the testimonies of all the wreckers of the supplies of meat, fish, tinned goods and vegetables. … Why the ‘secrets’? We should publish them.

It would also be good to publish the testimonies of the ‘Intelligence Service’ agents . . . about the subversive activity of the Vickers employees, who have bombed, set fire to and damaged our factories and buildings. . . . Why is this rich material being kept secret?’. (Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (13 September 1930), in:

Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 213).

and proposed the same course be adopted in the case of the testimony of Professor Leonid Ramzin, the principal defendant in the ‘Industrial Party’ trial of 1930, if his testimony was corroborated:

“If Ramzin’s testimonies are confirmed and corroborated … that will be a serious victory for the OGPU, since we’ll make the material available in some form to Comintern sections and the workers of the world.”

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Menzhinsky (undated), in: Lars T. Lih et al.: ibid.; p. 196).

Checking Up

The letters throw interesting light on Stalin’s methods of work –particularly on the importance he attached to the selection of cadres and the checking-up on the fulfilment of decisions:

“The slogans ‘checking up on fulfilment’ and ‘selection of officials’ are ubiquitous”,

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction, Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.); ibid.; p. 14).

and we find him writing to Molotov congratulating him on his practice of checking-up on fulfilment:

“You’ve achieved a sample of Leninist checking up on fulfilment. If it is required, let me congratulate you on your success”

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (10 October 1930), In: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 221),

“The Politburo has adopted my proposals concerning grain procurement. This is good, but in my opinion it is inadequate. Now the problem is fulfilling the Politburo’s decision. … Therefore it is necessary to demand the following from procurement organisations, the OGPU, the Collective Farm Centre, and so forth:

a) copies of their instructions to subordinate organs concerning the fulfilment of the Politburo’s decision; b) regular reports every two weeks (even better, once a week) about the results of the fulfilment of the decisions”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (21 August 1929). in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.); ibid.; p. 168).

Stalin and the World Revolutionary Movement

Finally, the letters clearly reveal that in upholding the principle that socialism could be built in one country, Stalin in no way ‘abandoned the cause of world revolution’, as Trotsky alleges;

‘”Stalin was not hypocritical in his support for world revolution, since from his point of view no sacrifice of state interests was involved.

Stalin comes out of the letters with his revolutionary credentials in good order…

As first servant of the Soviet state, he was also first servant of the world revolution…

The letters refute the Trotsky-derived interpretation of ‘socialism in one country’ as an isolationist rejection of revolution elsewhere…

The letters show that Stalin did not see revolutionary interests and state interests in either-or terms”.

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.); ibid.: pp.28, 36, 62).

For example, the letters reveal his great personal interest in the class struggle of the British workers:

“Stalin’s remarks indicate that he was very involved in the British situation”.

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 30).

Thus, when the British miners’ strike began on 1 May 1926, Stalin insisted that every possible assistance be rendered to them:

“We must publish the complete text of the resolution of our workers… in support of the British strikers in general and the coal-miners in particular in all the most important languages of the West as quickly as possible. … This is a fighting matter and should not be allowed to fall by the wayside”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (26 May 1926), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 104).

“The delegation of British coal miners should be arriving any day… They should be met ‘by all the rules of the game’ and as much money as possible should be collected for them. I’ve heard that the Americans have promised 1 million dollars. We have to collect and send possibly 1 million or 2 million roubles (less than the Americans is impossible) or perhaps a whole 3 million, The situation in England is serious, and it obliges us to make serious sacrifices’”

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (2? August 1926). in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 119).

The letters also demonstrate his keen interest in, and support for, the Chinese Revolution:

“Stalin sees the success of the Chinese Communist Party as a matter of both state and revolutionary interest”,

(Lars T. Lih: Introduction, Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p.33).

and show that, despite Opposition criticism, Stalin was convinced that the Comintern’s policy with regard to China had been correct:

“Never have I been so deeply and firmly convinced of the correctness of our policy . . . in China . . as I am now”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (11 July 1927), in: Lars T. Lih et al (Eds.): ibid.; p. 143).

and he

“… insisted that the blame for the failure of Comintern strategy lay with the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party”, (Lars T. Lih: Introduction to: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): op. cit.; p.32).

which he characterised as ‘not a genuine Communist Party’:

“… unfortunately we don’t have a real or, if you like, an actual Communist Party in China. . . . What is the current Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? Nothing but an ‘amalgamation’ of general phrases gathered here and there, not linked to one another with any line or guiding idea. I don’t want to be very demanding toward the Central Committee of the CCP. I know that one can’t be too demanding toward it. But here is a simple demand: fulfil the directives of the Comintern. Has it fulfilled these directives? No.

There is not a single Marxist mind in the Central Committee capable of understanding . . . the social underpinning of the events now occurring. … The CCP sometimes babbles about the hegemony of the proletariat.

But … the CCP does not have a clue (literally, not a clue) about hegemony.

That’s the reason why the Comintern’s directives are not fulfilled.

That is why I now believe the question of the Party is the main question of the Chinese revolution”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov C9 Jul1 1927), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; pp.140-41).

In 1929, Stalin even favoured military intervention in Manchuria in support of the Chinese Revolution:

“I think that it’s time to think about organising an uprising by a revolutionary movement in Manchuria. … We need to organise two double-regiment brigades, chiefly made up of Chinese, outfit them with everything necessary (artillery, machine-guns, and so on), put Chinese at the head of the brigade, and send them into Manchuria with the following assignment: to stir up a rebellion among the Manchurian troops, … to occupy Harbin and, after gathering force, to declare Chang Hsueh-liang overthrown, establish a revolutionary government. …This we can, and I think should, do. No ‘international law’ contradicts this task”.

(Josef V, Stalin: Letter to Vyacheslav Molotov (7 October 1929), in: Lars T. Lih et al. (Eds.): ibid.; p. 182).

Bill Bland on the Enforced Resettlements in the Soviet Union

INTRODUCTION

In response to an article by Alliance: Alliance number 13: “Chechnya – Oil And the Divided Russian Capitalists”, we received a letter from one “A.E.”

A.E. essentially asked us to substantiate a Marxist-Leninist position on Chechnya, given that “the national rights” were violated.

The exact note we received was as follows:

“In discussion of Alliance’s article “Chechenya, Oil, and the Divided Capitalist Class” it was brought up that:
in 1936 Chechenya-Ingushetia became not a “union republic” within the USSR, but an “autonomous republic” within the Russian “union republic” and hence didn’t have the right to self determination with respect to either the USSR or Russia;
and in 1944, not just rebel Nazi sympathizers were “transported away from the front”, but virtually the entire Chechen-Ingush population was removed, and even thousands of Chechen Red Army men were deported.

How does Alliance justify the position set forth at the beginning of its article on Chechenya?”

Our to date best answer was given by the late Comrade Bland. We re-print this. We had hoped to update this article with new materials from the archives, but time has marched on and we have been unable to obtain time.

Lest it be thought we are prevaricating, Bland’s response is a a very good reply.

THE ENFORCED RESETTLEMENTS

(A paper read by Bill Bland to the Stalin Society in London in July 1993)

Introduction

In the course of his secret speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev alleged that, on Stalin’s initiative, five small nations were deported from their homes to other regions of the Soviet Union:

“All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude Violations of the basic Leninist ‘principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state., We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations. . . Already at the end of 1943 . . a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived., In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944 all the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to far-away places from the territory of the Kabarda-Balkar Autonomous Republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardin Republic”.

(Russian Institute, Columbia University: ‘The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents’; New York; 1956; p. 57).

The Transplanted Nations

The five small nations referred to by Khrushchev were

1) the Karachai (some 76,000 in 1939), speaking a Turkic language, mostly Sunni Muslims, who lived on the northern slopes of the Caucasus mountains.

A Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Region was established in January 1922 for the Karachai and Cherkess (Circassian) peoples, and divided in 1926 to form separate Karachai and Cherkess Autonomous Regions. The Karachai Autonomous Rekion (‘A’ on map) (area: 3,800 square miles) elected 3 representatives to the Soviet of Nationalities. It was occupied by German troops between August 1942 and January 1943.

2) the Kalmyks (some 134,000 in 1939), speaking a Mongol language, mostly

Buddhists, who lived a few hundred miles north of the Caucasus Mountains to the west of the Volga.

The Kalmyk Autonomous Region (area: 28,000 square miles) was established in November 1920 and transformed into the Kalmyk Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (‘B’ on map) (capital: Elista) in October 1935. In 1937 it elected 9 representatives to the Soviet of Nationalities. The area was occupied by German troops from late 1942 to January 1943.

3) the Chechens (some 408,000 in 1939) and

4) the Ingush (some 92,000 in 1939);

were closely related ethnically and linguistically. They spoke a Turkic language, were mostly Sunni Muslims, and lived on the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains.

The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘C’ on map) (area: 6,000 square miles; capital: Grozny) was established in December 1936 by the amalgamation of the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions. It sent 6 representatives to the Soviet of Nationalities (5 Chechens and 1 Ingush). German troops occupied the western part of the republic in the autumn of 1942 but were halted at the approaches to Grozny.

5) the Balkars (some 43,000 in 1939), speaking a Turkic language, mostly Sunni Muslims, who lived on the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains.

The Kabarda-Balkar Autonomous Region was established in January 1922 and transformed into the Kabarda-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘D’ on map; area: 4,800 square miles; capital: Nalchik) in December 1936. It sent 4 representatives to the Soviet of Nationalities in 1937. The area was occupied by German troops between October 1942 and January 1943.

MAP ONE :

Limits of German Advance (1942-43).

A : The KARACHAI Autonomous Region.

B : The KALMYK Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

C : The CHECHEN-INGUSH Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,

D The KABARDA-BALKAR Autonomous Region.

But, in fact, three further small nations were forcibly resettled at this time which Khruschev refrained from mentioning in his secret speech. These nations were:

6) the Volga Germans, who came to the Volga region during the reign of Catherine the Great in the 18th century, numbered some 382,000 in 1939, were German in ethnical origin, and mostly Mennonite or Lutheran in religion. They lived in the region of the Volga near the city of Saratov.

The German Volga Labour Commune was established in October 1918, and transformed in February 1924 into the Volga-German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘E’ on map) (area: 10,500 square miles; population: some 605,500 in 1939; capital: Engels). The area was not occupied by German forces.

7) the Crimean Tatars, who numbered some 202,000 in 1939, spoke a Turkic language, were mostly Sunni Muslims and lived in the Crimean Peninsula.

The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘F’ on map) (area: 10,000 square miles; population some 1,126,800 in 1939; capital: Simferopol) was established in the Crimean Peninsula in October 1921. The area was occupied by German forces between 1941 and 1944.

8) the Meskhetians (so called only after the late 1950s) who numbered some 150,000 people of various ethnical origins but all speaking Turkic languages, mostly Sunni Muslims, living in the south-west of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (in the area marked ‘G’ on map), near the Turkish border. The area was not occupied by German forces.

MAP 2

E : The VOLGA-GERMAN Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

F : The CRIMEAN Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

G : The MESKHETIANS.

The data above are drawn from:

—- ‘The great Soviet Encyclopedia’; New York; 1973-83.

Robert Conquest: ‘The Nationa Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationlaities’; London 1970.

Walter Kolarz: ‘Russia & Her Colonies’; London; 1952.

Ronald Wixman: ‘The peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook’; London; 1984.

The Dates of the Resettlements

According to Khrushchev in his secret speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the dates of the resettlements were as follows:

End of 1943: The Karachai.

End of December 1943: The Kalmyks.

March 1944: The Chechens and Ingush.

April 1944: The Balkars.

(Russian Institute, Columbia University: op. cit.; p. 57).

According to Robert Conquest, the dates of the resettlements of the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars were as follows:

August 1941: The Volga Germans.

c. June 1944: The Crimean Tatars.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 100).

To Conquest the date of the resettlement of the Meskhetians is unknown” (Robert Conquest: ibid.; p. 100).

But the American historian Ronald Suny fixes the date as 1947:

“More than 2,000 Georgians were settled in these depleted lands in December 1943. Four years later about 8,000 Muslims in Georgia, the Meskhetian Turks, . . were deported to Central Asia”.

(Ronald G. Suny: ‘The Making of the Georgian Nation’; London; 1989; p.289).

The Places of Resettlement

The nations forcibly resettled in 1941-47 were exiled to eastern regions of the USSR, as shown on the map below:

Map 3

The Total of the Resettled

The total number of persons resettled in 1941-47 was as follows:

Chechens: 408,000

Volga Germans: 382,000

Crimean Tatars: 202,000

Meskhetians: 150,000

Kalmyks: 134,000

Ingush: 92,000

Karachai: 76,000

Balkars: 43,000

1,487,000

Robert.Conquest gives a slightly higher estimate of

“. . . approximately 1,650,000″.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 65).

The Political Changes

Consequent upon the enforced resettlements, certain political changes were made:

1. The Karachai Autononmous Region (‘A’ on map One) was dissolved and most of its territory ceded to the Georgian SSR.

2. The Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘B’ on map One) was dissolved and most of its territory ceded to a new Astrakhan Region of Russia.

3. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘C’ on map One) was dissolved, and most of its territory transferred to a new Grozny Province of Russia.

4. The Kabarda-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘D’ on map One) was renamed the Kabarda ASSR, with much of its territory ceded to the Georgian SSR.

5. The Volga-German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘E’ on map Two) was dissolved and most of its territory transferred to the Saratov Province of Russia.

6. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (‘F’ on map Two) was dissolved and its territory renamed the Crimean Province of Russia.

The Reasons for Khrushchev’s Omissions

One must consider why Khrushchev should have omitted from the charges made at the 20th Congress the enforced resettlement of three small nations who were so resettled. He condemns in general as

“. . . monstrous . . . rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state . . . the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations”. (Russian Institute, Columbia University: op. cit.; p. 57).

but makes no mention of three of the peoples resettled in precisely the same way:

“Khrushchev’s speech . . . named only the Chechens, Ingush, Baikars, Karachai and Kalmyks as suffering peoples, making no reference to the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars or Meskhetians”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 142).

Yet:

“Khrushchev had clearly implied that the whole deportation was a crime and should be reversed”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 143).

And one can hardly credit Khrushchev with a desire to whitewash Stalin’s alleged crimes.

Indeed, the Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Aleksandr Gorkin*,

“. . . who had been a signatory to the original deportation decrees”, (Robert Conquest- ibid.; p. 145).

said in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in February 1957:

“The practical implementation of measures for the restoration of the national autonomy of these peoples requires a certain amount of time.. . .

The resettlement of citizens of the stated nationalities who have expressed a desire to return to regions of former residence must be conducted in an organised manner”.

(A. Gorkin, in: ‘Pravda’, 12 February 1957, in: Robert Conquest: ibid.; p. 146).

Nor can Khrushchev’s failure to mention in his secret speech three of the resettled peoples be attributed to ignorance of the fact of their resettlement. For a published decree of the Presidiuum of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 1941 lays down:

“The State Committee of Defence has been instructed to carry out urgently the transfer of all Volga Germans”.

(Decree of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 28 August 1941, in: ‘Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR’, No. 38, 2 September 1941, in: Robert Conquest: ibid.; p. 63).

And a similar published decree of June 1946 records that:

“.. . during the Great Patriotic War, the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars were resettled in other regions of the USSR”.

(Decree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet, 25 June 1946, in: ‘Izvestia’ , 26 June 1946, in: Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 47).

What, then, distinguished the unmentioned Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars and Meskhetians from the other resettled nations?

Only the fact that the peoples mentioned were permitted by the Krushchevite revisionists to-return to their original home areas, while the unmentioned peoples were not:

“Two of the suppressed republics failed to re-emerge.. . . In 1964 a decree was published publicly rehabilitating the Volga Germans, but still not granting them the right to return to their old settlements. That is, the accusations were at last withdrawn, but the punishment remained in force. From the timing this rehabilitation seems to have been connected with Khrushchev’s effort to secure a detente with West Germany. . . .

It was not until 1967 that a decree actually withdrawing the accusations against the Crimean Tatars . . . was promulgated. . . .

Like the Volga Germans, the withdrawal of the accusations against the Crimean Tatars . . . was not accompanied by an abrogation of the official penalties. . . .

Lastly, an unpublished decree of the Supreme Soviet of 31 October 1956 freed the Meskhetians from MVD control, without giving them the right to return home”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 179, 183, 185, 186, 187).

The Official Motives for the Resettlements

The official reasons for the resettlements were stated to be state security.

In seven out of the eight cases (that is, in all the cases except that of the Meskhetians), the peoples resettled were accused of mass treachery during the Second World War. The measures of enforced resettlement in these cases were presented not as a mass punishment, but as a Preventive measure to avoid the necessity of mass punishment:

“According to trustworthy information received by the military authorities, there are among the German population living in the Volga area thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies who, on a signal being given from Germany, are to carry out sabotage in the area inhabited by the Germans of the Volga.

None of the Germans living in the Volga area has reported to the Soviet authorities the existence of such a large number of diversionists and spies among the Germans; consequently, the German population of the Volga conceals enemies of the Soviet people and of Soviet authority in its midst.

In case of diversionist acts being carried out at a signal from Germany by German diversionists and spies in the Volga-German Republic or in the adjacent areas and bloodshed taking place, the Soviet Government will be obliged, according to the laws in force during the war period, to take punitive measures against the whole of the German population of the Volga.

In order to avoid undesirable events of this nature and to prevent serious bloodshed, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR have found it necessary to transfer the whole of the German population living in the Volga area into other areas”. (Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Decree of 28 August 1941, in: ‘Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR’, No. 38, 2 September 1941, in: Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 62).

“During the Great Patriotic War . . . . many Chechens and Crimean Tatars, at the instigation of German agents, joined volunteer units organised by the Germans and, together with German troops, engaged in armed struggle against units of the Red Army; also at the bidding of the Germans they formed diversionary bands for the struggle against Soviet authority in the rear; meanwhile the main mass of the population of the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean ASSRs took no counter-action against these betrayers of the Fatherland.

In connection with this, the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars were resettled in other regions of the USSR”

(Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Decree of 25 June 1946, in: Robert Conquest” ibid.; p. 47).

Khrushchev himself denies that the resettlements were dictated by security factors:

“This deportation action was not dictated by any military considerations”. (Russan Institute, Columbia University: op. cit.; p. 57).

Many anti-Soviet historians accept this view, according to which Stalin was a thoroughly evil man who woke up one morning and said: ‘What can I do today that’s really nasty? I know! I’ll transplant the Chechens — who are loyal Soviet citizens — to Kazakhstan!’.

But this theory has problems for anti-Soviet historians, who are fond of telling us that socialism was so awful that every sensible Soviet citizen welcomed the Nazis with open arms.

The truth lies between these two extremes. While there were individual traitors among all the nations of the Soviet Union, a few small nations were guilty of mass treachery.

An authoritative textbook of Soviet law tells us:

“In the background of patriotic enthusiasm which inflamed the nations of the Soviet country united against the common enemy . . . there stand out strangely the monstrous, criminal and treacherous acts of some small, backward nations which gave support to the enemy in the expectation of receiving ‘privileges’ from him at the expense of the other nations of the Soviet Union. These acts called for necessary and extraordinary measures by the Soviet State in the interests of the USSR as a whole”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 81, citing: Ilya D. Levin (Ed.): ‘Soviet State Law’; Moscow; 1947).

Alexander Dallin* recounts that early in the Soviet-German war:

“. . . revolts broke out among some of the Caucasian Mountaineers. Most widepread in the Muslim areas, particularly among the Chechens and Karachai, these rebellions prepared the ground for a change of regime . . . Faced with a concentrated German onslaught and a lack of support from the indigenous population, the Red Army retreated from Rostov to the Greater Caucasus Mountains without giving battle. . . .

In the Karachai region the bulk of the Muslim Mountaineers accorded the Germans a more genuine welcome than in most other occupied areas.

The Germans . . . announced the formation of a Karachai voluntary squadron of horsemen to fight with the German Army. . . .

During the entire occupation, there was no evidence of anti-German activity in the Karachai area. . .

After the conquest of the Crimea (by the Germans — Ed.) they and other Tatar ‘volunteers’ were organised in auxiliary military units to fight on the German side”.

(Alexander Dallin: ‘German Rule in Russia: 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies’; London; 1981; p. 244, 246, 258).

“The Germans were welcomed by practically the entire population of the Crimea and the . . . Muslim areas of the northern Caucasus. . .The Balkars were Muslims and unlike the Christian Kabardinians, collaborated en masse with the enemy”.

(Robert Magidoff: ‘The Kremlin vs. the People: The Story of the Cold Civil War in Stalin’s Russia’; New York; 1953; p. 20, 22).

“The Muslim Balkars were more outspokenly pro-German than the mostly non-Muslim Kabardinians. Although the Germans did not penetrate far into the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (south of Grozny) , these two peoples appear to have made no secret of their sympathy for the Germans. . .

Altogether, :.the Tatars’ record was as bad as could be. They had formed a police force under German control and had been highly active in the Gestapo”.

(Alexander Werth: ‘Russia at War: 1941-1945′; London; 1964; p. 579-80, 838).

“When the German armies occupied the Northern Caucasus region many mountaineers manifested their hostility towards the Soviet regime. They attempted to use the retreat of the Red Army to free themselves from what they considered the ‘Russian yoke’. Over twenty years of Soviet rule had not altered their imagined conviction that Russia’s foes were their friends. . . .

In Chechenia, it would seem that Muslim opposition to the Soviet regime was never quite suppressed. . . . The mullahs, who were powerful opponents of the Soviet regime, even managed to keep alive the illegal Shariah courts. . . .

The hostile attitude of the Chechens towards the Soviet Russian regime was often manifested. . . .

The Ingush . . . showed themselves no less loyal to Islam”.

(Walter Kolarz: op. cit.; p. 185, 187).

“In most Crimean cities the German advancing army was met with jubilation and calls of ‘liberators’ from the local Tatar population. . .

Manstein* was relatively successful in his attempts to gain active support from the Tatars. According to both German and Tatar evidence, the Germans persuaded between 15,000 and 20,000 Tatars to form self-defence battalions that were partially armed by the Germans and sent into the mountains to hunt down partisan units. . . . From the various Caucasian peoples over 110,000 volunteers were recruited; and the Kalmyks provided about 5,000 volunteers. . . .

Large numbers of Tatar villagers as well as six organised Tatar self-defence battalions fought hard against the Soviet partisans.,

(Alan W. Fisher: ‘The Crimean Tatars’; Stanford (USA); 1987; p. 153, 155, 159).

“A large part of the Crimean Tatar population did not consider the government in Moscow to be their ‘sovereign’ nor the USSR to be their country. . . .

Tatar ‘collaboration; with the Germans took the following forms.. . .

First, early in 1942 the Germans encouraged the creation of ‘selfdefence’ battalions of Tatars to ‘defend’ their villages against the activities of Soviet partisans in the Crimea. . . . According to German records, between 15,000 and 20,000 Crimean Tatars formed these military units. Second with German aid, Tatars established local ‘Muslim Committees’ to take over the responsibility for most non-political and non-military affairs”.

(Alan W. Fisher: ‘The Crimean Tatars, the USSR and Turkey’, in: William 0. McCagg, jun. & Brian D. Silver (Eds.): ‘Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers’;. New York; 1979; p. 12).

“As German troops overran western Russia in July and August 1941, they came across German villages.. . .

When German (or Romanian) soldiers arrived in such a village, they were greeted as liberators. . . .

Some of them (the Soviet Germans — Ed.) . . . volunteered for work in the Reich during the war. . . . Some of these defected fully to the Nazis and served in the German armed forces”.

(Adam Giesinger: ‘From Catherine to Khrushchev: The Story of

Russia’s Germans’; Battleford (Canada); 1974; p. 304, 313).

“German reports make it clear, too, that a Soviet writer was not exaggerating when he wrote that right from the beginning pro-Soviet partisans in the Crimea ‘were deprived of the support of the local population”‘.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 100, citing: Ivan A. Kozlov: ‘In the Crimean Underground’; Moscow; 1948).

The Case of the Meskhetians

The Meskhetians are a special case among the transplanted nations in that their transplantation took place later than that of the other nations in 1947 — and they were not accused of treachery:

“The peoples of Meskhetia were never charged with collaborating with the Germans”.

(S. Enders Wimbush & Ronald Wixman: ‘The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in ‘Canadian Slavonic Papers’, Volume 17, Nos. Soviet Central Asia’, in: 2/3, (summer/fall 1975), p. 320).

“It was not alleged against them (the Meskhetians Ed.) that they had collaborated with the Germans — who had not come within hundreds of miles of the area. In fact, the move was represented as not being of a penal nature at all”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 48-49).

But during the Second World War, the Allied Powers had occasion to complain on several occasions that Turkey was permitting Germany to violate the Montreux Convention of 1936 on the Dardanelles. Thus, in June 1945 immediately after the end of the war, the Soviet government demanded revision of the Convention to allow for Soviet forces to share in the administration of the straits and the return of certain frontier areas taken from Soviet territory by what the Soviet government declared were ‘imposed’ treaties in 1921.

(‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 7,737).

While the Western Powers had, during the war, supported demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention, Churchill* in February 1946 signalled the end of Anglo-American partnership with the Soviet Union when he declared in Fulton:

“From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent”.

(‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 7,771).

Thus, in August 1946 Turkey, with the backing of the US imperialists rejected the Soviet proposals for joint supervision of the straits on the grounds that:

“. . the Soviet demand for the participation in the defence of the Straits is incompatible with Turkish sovereignty”. (‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 8,102).

In that month (August 1946) Moscow Radio broadcast a series of captured documents from the German Foreign Office which revealed, for example, that former Turkish Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu* told the Germans in August 1942:

“As a Turk, I passionately desire the destruction of Russia”. (‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 8,076).

When in March 1947, US President Harry Truman asked Congress for immediate ‘aid’ to Turkey, the Soviet newspaper ‘Izvestia’ commented:

“American ‘assistance’ to Turkey is obviously aimed at putting that country under US control”.

(‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 6; p. 8,493).

It was at this time that, as a measure of defence, the Soviet government resettled the Turkic Meskhetians living on the Soviet-Turkish frontier. Robert Conquest comments:

“The Meskhetians are in fact best described as Turkish. . . . The population was one which might be thought to have Turkish sympathies.”

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 48).

Incidentally, one of the first changes in Soviet foreign policy after the death of Stalin and the coming to power of the new Soviet revisionist leadership was the renunciation, in May 1953, of the Soviet territorial claims on Turkey and of its demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention.

(‘Keesing’s Contemporary Archives’, Volume 13; p. 13,101).

Contrary to Marxist-Leninist Principles?

According to Khrushchev, the resettlements were carried out in violation of the Marxist-Leninist principles on the national question:

“All the more monstrous are those acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations”.

(Russian Institute, Columbia University: op. cit.; p. 57).

But Lenin always insisted that:

“. . . the interests of Socialism are higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-determination”.

(Vladimir I. Lenin: ‘On the History of the Question of the Unfortunate Peace’ (January, 1918), in: ‘Selected Works’, Volume 3; Moscow; 1967; p. 533).

As did Stalin:

“In addition to the right of nations to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right of self-determination is subordinate to this latter right. . . . The right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship. The former must yield to the latter”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs, 12th Congress of RCP (April 1923), in: ‘Works’, Volume 5; Moscow; 1953; p. 270).

Clearly, if there were valid reasons to regard the resettlements as necessary for the security of the socialist state, they were fully in accord with Marxist-Leninist principles on the national question.

Contrary to Soviet Legality?

According to many Soviet revisionist sources, the enforced resettlements were contrary to Soviet legality:

“In December 1943, in violation of socialist legality, the Kalmyks were uprooted from the republic’s territory and resettled in the country’s eastern regions”.

(‘Great Soviet Encyclopedia’, Volume 11; New York; 1976; p. 365).

“In March 1944, as a result of violations of socialist legality, the Balkars were resettled in regions of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan”.

(‘Great Soviet Encyclopedia’, Volume 11; ibid.; p. 320).

But an authoritative book on Soviet law sets out the circumstances in which groups of citizens may legally be resettled in other parts of the Soviet Union:

“Resettlement is carried out by the state organs of the USSR:

1) for the purpose of realising measures connected with state security and defence of state frontiers;

2) for the purpose of acquiring lands for agricultural production”.

The first function is carried out by the organs of state security”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 82, citing: Semen S. Studentiev, Viktor A. Vlasov & Ivan I. Evtikhiev: ‘Administrative Law of the USSR’; Moscow; 1950).

The resettlements with which we are here concerned were carried out, as we shall see, for the first of these two purposes — that is, for reasons of state security and defence of state frontiers — and so were carried out legally by the state security services.

Genocide?

Anti-Soviet historians often describe the enforced resettlements as acts of ‘genocide’. This is implied in the title of Robert Conquest’s book on the transplantations — ‘The Nation Killers’.

In fact, the UN. Convention on the Prevention and punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted in December 1948, defines genocide as an act:

“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical or religious group, as such”.

(UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (December 1948), in: Edmund J. Osmanczyk: ‘The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Relations’; New York; 1990; p. 328).

But enforced resettlement of national groups can in no way be identified with intent to destroy them. Indeed, even such a hostile commentator as Robert Conquest is compelled to admit:

“Nothing here matches the horror of the Nazi gas chambers. These nations were not physically annihilated”. (Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 11).

In fact, the resettled peoples were allotted land and given state assistance to build a new life in the areas in which they were resettled. The Volga Germans, for example, were resettled:

“with the promise that the migrants shall be allotted land and that they should be given assistance by the State in settling in the new areas”.

(Decree of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, 28 August 1941, in: Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 62-63).

while the resettled Chechens and Crimean Tatars

“. . . were given land, together with the necessary governmental assistance for their economic establishment”.

(Decree of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, 25 June 1946, in: Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 47).

The Collective Nature of the Decisions on Resettlement

As we have seen, Khrushchev describes Stalin as the:

“initiator”

(Russian Institute, Columbia University: op. cit.; p. 57).

of the resettlements.

This may well be true, but the decisions on resettlement were undoubtedly collective and not individual decisions.

Robert Conquest testifies that the defector Colonel Grigory Tokaev:

“Had some access to what was being said in high political and military circles”

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 99).

and Tokaev asserts

“. . . that the Soviet General Staff reported in 1940 that the population of the northern Caucasus would prove to be a handicap in case of war and recommended that the ‘special measures’ be taken in good time.

The actual decision to deport the Chechens is described by Tokaev as having been taken initially at a joint meeting of the Politburo and High Command on 11 February 1943, almost a year before it was put into effect”.

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 99).

Incidentally, Tokaev states that:

“It . . . the operation was beautifully planned”

(Grigory A, Tokaev: ‘Comrade X’; London; 1956; p. 259).

and that:

“Beria was in charge of the operation”.

(Grigory A. Tokaev: ibid.; p. 257).

And although Krushchev denounced (some of) the resettlements three years after Stalin’s death, Conquest points out that at the time:

“He (Khrushchev — Ed.) does not claim that he made any protest”. (Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 192).

The Political Background to the Treason

We have seen that the disloyalty which brought about the resettlements was a mass phenomenon only in a few small nations of the Soviet Union, and so cannot be regarded as the result of an incorrect national policy on the part of the Soviet Marxist-Leninists.

In fact, even anti-Soviet historians testify to the overall success of the Soviet national policy in the time of Stalin:

“The so-called Lenin-Stalin nationality policy has achieved outstanding successes in enabling once backward peoples to modernise themselves”.

(William 0. McCagg, junior & Brian D. Silver (Eds): Introduction to:

‘Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers’; New York; 1979; p. xiv).

Speaking to the highlanders of the Caucasus in 1920, Stalin said:

“In granting you autonomy, Russia restores the liberties which were stolen from you by the bloodsucking tsars and the tyrannous Tsarist generals. …

Each of the peoples — Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Kabardinians, Balkars, Karachais, and also the Cossacks who remain within the autonomous highland territory — should have its National Soviet to administer the affairs of the given people in accordance with its manner of life and specific features”.

(Josef V. Stalin: Report on Soviet Autonomy for the Terak Region, Congress of the Peoples of the Terek Region (November 1920), in: ‘Works’, Volume 4; Moscow; 1953; p. 415).

Even Robert Conquest admits:

“One of the most characteristic things in the life of the Soviet minorities is the care taken to provide them with a Soviet literature of their own”. .

(Robert Conquest: op. cit.; p. 41).

The nations who succumbed to mass treachery were subject to special pressures — of foreign nationalism (German or Turkish) and -in the case if the Causasus — of reactionary Muslim mullahs.

Particularly important in the background to the treachery was the political activity in the North Caucasus of concealed revisionist conspirators. At his treason trial in March 1938, Vladimir Ivanov* admitted:

“In 1929 1 was sent to the North Caucasus as the Second Secretary , Bukharin suggested to me that I should form a group of Rights in the North Caucasus. IL-’ added that the North Caucasus would play a very important part in our struggle against the Party and the Soviet power”.

(Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet ‘Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites’; Moscow; 1938; p. 118).

Ivanov’s evidence on this point was confirmed by another defendant in the same trial — Aleksey Rykov*:

“RYKOV: The Right centre devoted special attention to the North Caucasus owing to . . . the specific character of its traditions.

VYSHINSKY: To organise kulak actions, kulak insurrections?

RYKOV: of course”.

(Report of Court Proceedings ibid.; p. 165).

Conclusion

THE ENFORCED RESETTLEMENT OF EIGHT SMALL NATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1941-47 WAS A LEGAL MEASURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES, NECESSITATED BY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST SOVIET UNION.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

CHURCHILL, Winston L. S., British journalist, historian and conservative

politician (1874-1965); President, Board of Trade (1908-10); Home Secretary (1910-11); First Lord of Admiralty (1911-15); Minister of Munitions (1917); Secretary for War and Air (1919-21); Secretary for Colonies (1921-22); Chancellor of Exchequer (1924-29); First Lord of Admiralty (1939-40); Premier (1940-45, 1951-55).

CONQUEST, G. Robert A., British diplomat, historian and poet (1917 research fellow, London School of Economics (1956-58); senior fellow, Columbia University, New York (1964-65); fellow, Smithsonian Institution, Washington (1976-77); senior research fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford (1977- research associate, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA (1983- ) — Alexander, German-born American historian (1924- to ZUSA (1940); associate professor (1958-61), professor (1961- ), Columbia University, New York senior research fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford, USA (1971-78).

GORKIN, Aleksandr F., Soviet revisionist civil servant (1897-1992); Secretary, USSR Central Executive Committee (1937-38); Secretary, Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet (1938-57); Chairman, USSR Supreme Court (1957-72).

IVANOV, Vladimir I., Soviet revisionist politician (1893-1938); Secretary, North Caucasus, Regional Committee, CPSU (1927-31); Ist Secretary, Northern Regional Committee, CPSU (1931-38); USSR Commissar of Timber Industry (1937-38); found guilty of treason and executed (1938).

MANSTEIN, Fritz E. von, German military officer (1887-1973); field marshal (1942); commander on Soviet front (1942-43); imprisoned for war crimes (1943-53).

RYKOV, Alexsey I., Soviet revisionist politician (1881-1938); chairman, Supreme Council of National Economy (1918-21); RSFSR/USSR premier (1924-30); USSR Commissar for Communications (1931-36); expelled from CPSU (1937); found guilty of treason and executed (1938).

SARACOGLU. Sukru, Turkish national-bourgeois politician (1887-1953): Minister of Finance (1927-30); Minister of Justice (1933-38); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1938-42); Premier (1942-46); President, National Assembly (1948-50).

SUNY, Ronald G., American historian (1940- ); lecturer, Columbia University, New York (1967-68); assistant professor (1968-72), associate professor (1972-81), Oberlin College, Oberlin, USA; professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (1981- ).

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